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MASTERS ON MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Napoleon's Nightmare: Guerrilla Warfare in Spain (1808-1814) –
The French Army's Failed Counterinsurgency Effort

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Napoleon's Nightmare: Guerrilla Warfare in Spain (1808-1814) –The French Army's Failed Counterinsurgency Effort.

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Thesis: In the Peninsula war, Napoleon found himself forced to deal with a new kind of enemy: the Guerrilla. He gradually realized that he was waging two wars: a conventional war against the combined Spanish and British Armies, and an unconventional one against the people themselves. The dual effort, his misunderstanding of the character and power of the revolt in the Peninsula, and his inability to develop adequate unconventional war tactics, ultimately led to France's defeat in Spain.

Discussion: When the Spanish people rose up against the armies of Napoleon after 2 May 1808, no country in Europe had less chance of victory than Spain. But in direct contrast to what had happened elsewhere in Europe, the Spanish population responded to the defeats of their regular armies during the first three years of war (1808-1810) by continuing the fight on their own. The guerrillas appeared as a consequence of this popular uprising. Reacting to the French superiority in the open field, where the regular Spanish armies were repeatedly beaten, the guerrillas invented a new way to fight. The rise of the Spanish guerrilla, succored by the people, produced the struggle of *People in Arms* as briefly described by Clausewitz and Jomini.

The popular revolt, which eventually led to the guerrilla phenomenon, gave the Peninsula War the character of *National War*. Napoleon did not know how to cope with this unconventional war. His essentially kinetic approach attempted to crush popular support for the guerrillas by brutal reprisals: punishing the people severely after every guerrilla action. The guerrillas forced the French troops in the Peninsula into a dilemma that they could not resolve: How to fight simultaneously against the regular armies of Spain and Britain, while also combating a guerrilla that constantly jeopardized its rear. The guerrillas precluded the normal functioning of the Napoleonic administration and political control in many areas of Spain, hindered the supply of the French army, required the enemy to scatter his forces throughout the territory, and eventually exhausted it by the slow and constant attrition of men and supplies.

Conclusion: Conceiving the Peninsula War as a conventional campaign, Napoleon dismissed with contempt the unconventional war being waged in his rear. This was a grave mistake, for in fact the uprising of the Spanish people and the guerrilla precluded Napoleon from being able to summon troops sufficient to win the *decisive battle* against the Spanish and British armies. The guerrillas' actions against the French rear were a nightmare for the French troops, provoking a spiral of violence and plunder that could not succeed in this *national war* where the people were willing to suffer any misfortune to recover their independence and way of life.

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Preface

A government must never assume that its country's fate, its whole existence, hangs on the outcome of a single battle, no matter how decisive. Even after a defeat, there is always the possibility that a turn of fortune can be brought about by developing new sources of internal strength or through the natural decimation all offensives suffer in the long run or by means of help from abroad. There will always be time enough to die; like drowning man who will clutch instinctively at a straw, it is the natural law of the moral world that a nation that finds itself on the brink of an abyss will try to save itself by any means.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*¹

The Peninsula Campaign of Napoleon is called the Independence War by Spaniards.

Spain has fought twice to recover her soil. The first time was against the Moors, who had conquered almost all the Peninsula in the 8th century. It took eight centuries to expel them from Spain; the last Moorish kingdom was defeated and the Moors driven out in 1492, the year Columbus discovered the New World. The second time was in the early 19th century when Napoleon attempted to conquer Spain. At the time, Spain's Empire was dying: In just a few years, because of ruinous political alliances of the Bourbon kings, incompetent governments, and disastrous military campaigns, Spain lost most of her once powerful armies, and her navy had great difficulty dealing with pirates and corsairs who jeopardized trade on the Caribbean Sea and the lines of communication with America. Spain was bankrupt, politically and economically, and the king and his government were under attack due to the disaffection of the populace.

In this environment, Spaniards found themselves amidst French armies which had taken control of the main fortress of the north of Spain while Napoleon's generals conducted operations against Portugal. The French, acting more as invaders rather than allies, made many changes to the political situation in Spain by moving the royal family to France, forcing the king to abdicate, and installed a puppet government under the new king: Joseph, Napoleon's brother. Then, to Napoleon's great astonishment and chagrin, the people rose against foreign rule: almost every Spanish region organized its own opposing forces; the

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), 483

ordinary people, after rising in arms against French, either became guerrillas or joined the Spanish Army, both with the common goal of expelling the French from Spain. This Spanish resistance between 1808 and 1814 ended with the defeat of the Napoleonic army, and became the first *National War* – as defined by Clausewitz: an entire nation fighting to recover her independence, no matter how great the cost.

The guerrillas played a significant role in this successful *National War*. Of course decisive battles were won by regular armies, but without guerrillas those victories most likely would have been defeats. Guerrillas forced the French to deploy thousands of troops along their lines of communication and provide strong escort for the supplies. Furthermore, guerrillas also helped the regular army fighting shoulder to shoulder with them in many battles. At least four different effects can be attributed to the guerrillas: the forced deployment of thousands of French troops to protect lines of communications and supplies, the killing of a large number of French; the restricted mobility of their army, and the demoralization of the troops because of the constant threat, quiet but lethal.

This paper explains how and why the Peninsula War became the first *National War* of the modern era, and how and why Napoleon failed in the way he responded to the insurgency of guerrilla. This war is perhaps the principal contribution of the Peninsula War to modern war. It does not attempt to describe or discuss the conventional campaigns and the actions performed by the regular armies of Spain, Portugal and the British Expeditionary Force against Napoleon.

Finally, I would like to thank Andrea Helmlen and Stase Rodebaugh, restless workers of the Leadership Center at GRC, who once and again corrected my papers and drafts, provided me counsel and improved my grammar skills to a point never thought by me. Thanks to Dennis Bolster, too, one of those friends that come up unexpectedly; we shared a lot of time talking about the paper; he supported me when I was tired, discouraged, or in a

death trail in regard to the chapters of my paper. Even more important, he read all my drafts and provided me an invaluable feedback from the standpoint of someone who had not previous acknowledge about the topic. And last but not least, I would especially like to thank Dr. Donald F. Bittner, first of all, for suggesting the topic of my paper and encouraging me to address the MMS enterprise when I was dubious; thanks to his mentoring I have learnt a lot about a part of the history of my country previously unknown to me; second, for all his patience, new ideas, and suggestions with regard to new research and new points worthy to be developed in improving this work and forcing me to be more accurate in my statements and conclusions; thank so much.

A Commentary of the War in Spain

In Spain I was a witness... one fine night the companies of the train—men and horses—disappeared, and we were never able to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had thus made away with them... The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all the obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. What efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops of Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney, and Suchet to sustain themselves for six years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and Portuguese supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford, Blake, La Romana, Cuesta, Castaños, Reding, and Ballasteros!... As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first,—as at Fontenoy,—preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers.

Baron Antoine H. de Jomini “Article VII, National Wars” *The Art of War*²



Francisco de Goya, *los Desastres de la Guerra* [Disasters of War]

² Antoine H. de Jomini *The Art of War* (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1971), 19-21.

Introduction

The Spanish nation is different...The Spaniards have a noble and generous character, but they have a tendency to ferocity and cannot bear to be treated as a conquered nation. Reduced to despair, they would be prepared to unleash the most terrible and courageous rebellion, and the most vicious excesses

After revolt of 2 May 1808, letter to Napoleon written by his agent in Madrid¹

In 1807, in order to seize the navy of Portugal so that he could then attack England from the sea, Napoleon – then at the apex of his power, without a defeat on European soil, with the finest Army ever assembled, signed a treaty with Spain so that his army could march through Spain into Portugal. He conquered Portugal easily by force, with token help from a small Spanish Army. Not satisfied with Portugal alone, he then betrayed the Spanish monarch and people by abruptly forcing the King to abdicate and invaded Spain. Deceitfully invoking Spain's treaty with France, he quickly took the main fortresses and cities of northern Spain. Reacting to Napoleon's control of their government, the people in Madrid and other cities throughout the Peninsula rose up against the invading French. In response, Napoleon sent troops to rapidly subdue them. But then, the totally unexpected happened: the French Army was defeated at Baylen. This defeat triggered the withdrawal of French troops beyond the Ebro River. Napoleon responded by personally leading some 300,000 troops to deal with the Spanish Army. Its defeat was accomplished quickly, and Spain seemed to be his. Yet four years later, the great French Army left Spain, exhausted, totally demoralized, near starvation, and without food, basic clothing or supplies. It was a totally defeated force.

A strong case can be made that this occurred because first, the insurrection of the entire nation, and second, the gradual formation of a fierce and indomitable unconventional army: what has become known as the Guerrilla. The Guerrilla phenomenon arose as an aftermath of the popular uprising against the French invader that filled the vacuum left when the Spanish regular armies were beaten by Napoleon. Encouraged and supported by the people, the Spanish guerrillas gave the struggle the character of *People in Arms* - as later defined by

Clausewitz: the new concept, “Guerrilla,” represented the spirit of rebellion that undermined the foundations of the Napoleonic Empire.

The guerrillas forced the French troops on the Peninsula into a dilemma that they never resolved: How to fight against the regular armies of Spain and Britain (and Portugal), while simultaneously fighting against guerrilla operations that constantly threatened their rear, and the lines of communication and supply, thus forcing the deployment of more troops throughout the conquered territories. The guerrillas acted as Mao Tse-tung would write over ten decades later, “Innumerable gnats, which, like biting a giant both in front and in rear, ultimately exhausts them.”² They totally disputed the normal functioning of the Napoleonic administration and political control in Spain, hindered the supply of the French army, required the enemy to scatter its forces throughout the territory, and eventually exhausted and depleted the French forces by a slow and constant war of attrition.

Napoleon was present in Spain only during his successful campaign at the end of 1808. He never seemed able to grasp the danger and power of the insurrection of the people and the guerrilla. As was his rule, he ordered his generals to achieve a decisive battle against the regular army. However, the problems created by the insurgency precluded them from concentrating numbers of troops sufficient to defeat the combined Spanish, British and Portuguese armies. As a direct consequence of this failure, Napoleon’s myth of invincibility was shattered, the prestige of his troops was challenged, and his system of power began to crumble. In Europe, Austria first and then Russia broke their alliances with France. With his major enemy, Britain, fighting him in Spain, Napoleon was thus forced to fight on two fronts in eastern and western Europe, which he could not simultaneously sustain. The miscalculation regarding the Spanish situation was the leading cause of the downfall of his Empire, as he himself recognized later on Saint Helena: “The Spanish war has been a real ulcer, the first cause of the misfortunes of France.”³

Spain Betrayed; The Road to the Revolt

*As Spaniards it is necessary that we die for the King and for the Homeland, arming ourselves against the perfidious enemy with his color of friendship and alliance, who seeks to impose on us a heavy yoke, after having taken possession of the August person of the King; so let us proceed, to count on active providence to punish so much perfidy, coming to the aid of Madrid and other peoples and gaining our liberty, since no force can prevail against the loyal and brave, as are we Spanish!*⁴

Andres Torrejon, Mayor of Mostoles, May 3rd 1808

After defeating Austria at Ulm and Austerlitz in 1805, Prussia at Jena and Auerst d in 1806, Russia at Friedland in 1807, and signing the Peace of Tilsit with Tsar Alexander I in 1807, Napoleon was the master of continental Europe. The sole remaining enemy was Britain, whose conquest had been thwarted due to the defeat of the combined Spanish-French fleet at Trafalgar in 1805.⁵ Since then, the Emperor had been attempting to force her surrender by strangling that island state's foreign trade by means of an economic blockade via forbidding trade from the continent. But having lost most of his fleet at Trafalgar, he could not accomplish the blockade alone. He, therefore, requested that all the continental countries in Europe support the blockade, known as The Continental System.⁶

While Sweden, Sicily, and Portugal did not support the blockade, Portugal was an easy and attractive target: she had a substantial fleet, wealthy colonies in America, a minimal army, and her Prince was notoriously dull-witted.⁷ Therefore in July 1807, Napoleon decided to attack her. But to do so, he had to pass through Spain. So France and Spain signed a treaty at Fontainebleau⁸ whereby Spain agreed to allow Napoleon's troops to cross Spain and to join the campaign with 24,000 troops. In October 1807, French General Jean-Andoche Junot entered Spain leading the First Corps of Gironde.⁹ He marched his army to Portugal and conquered the country quickly; the King of Portugal and his family, with the assistance of Britain's Royal Navy, sought exile in Brazil.

While Junot was conquering Portugal, the political situation in Spain rapidly deteriorated. Ferdinand, the Prince of Asturias,* attempted a *coup d'état* against his father, Charles IV and Manuel Godoy, the Prime Minister and favorite of the Queen.¹⁰ Napoleon took advantage of this instability and accused Spain of disunity and bad faith. Considering France no longer bound by the Fontainebleau treaty¹¹ he sent 70,000 more troops to Spain¹² under the command of Marshal Joachim Murat, who was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all French forces in Spain.¹³ Murat crossed the Pyrenees in February 1808 and deployed his Corps throughout the north of Spain. He seized control “of the most important fortresses of northern Spain (Pamplona on 16 Feb, Barcelona 29 Feb, Figueras 18 Mar, and San Sebastian on 5 Mar) by a mixture of trickery and force, while another body of French troops advanced south towards Madrid.”¹⁴ (see Map 2 in Apex A)

Alarmed by these events, Godoy recalled Spanish forces from Portugal and moved the Royal family to Aranjuez Palace** while making arrangements to move them to America.”¹⁵ (see Map 1, Apex A). When the Spanish people realized the intentions of King Charles IV and Godoy to leave Spain, there was a major riot: Godoy was sacked and taken into custody, and Charles IV agreed to abdicate in favor of Ferdinand who became Ferdinand VII.¹⁶ Napoleon rejected the abdication, called Ferdinand, Charles, and the Queen to Bayonne, and convinced them to surrender their rights to him. He then established his brother Joseph as the Spanish King¹⁷ while the Royal family was taken prisoner in France where they spent the rest of the war. Meanwhile the situation in Madrid, where Murat had arrived and established Regency, was deteriorating rapidly. On 2 May, when French troops tried to move the royal children to Bayonne, Madrid’s citizens attempted to

* Prince of Asturias is the title of the heir of Spanish throne.

** Aranjuez Palace is located 31 miles south of Madrid. It used to be the summer season palace of royal family.

stop it. Then Murat brutally suppressed the riot, triggering what would eventually be called The Peninsula War.¹⁸

The news of what had happened in Madrid spread rapidly throughout Spain with many local governments organizing corps of volunteers to help Madrid and instigate an uprising against Napoleonic troops by encouraging locals to resist forcefully outsiders attacking their nation's values, traditions, and way of life. This marked the first stages of revolt. The first to join were the two mayors of Mostoles (a village south of Madrid) who signed a declaration that roused its citizens to assist the people of Madrid. When the news arrived in Badajoz (the main city of Extremadura), the Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish troops there sent a declaration to all the citizens of the region encouraging them to rise up against Napoleonic troops:

...Even though the news is not entirely true, it is enough for every good Spaniard to take up arms and be prepared to defend our homeland... and everything must be accomplished with lightning speed, and then they will understand that we prefer any misfortune and onerous tasks rather than suffer unjust oppression.¹⁹

Events moved quickly. On 5 May Seville rose up against the French; this provoked the uprising of the entire Andalusia region. Then on the 9th, Oviedo, Santander, and Corunna, and then almost all the cities not occupied by the French, arose.²⁰ (see Map 2, Apex A) On 25 May the *Junta* of Asturias declared war against Napoleon; some days later, the *Junta* of Andalusia joined Asturias by declaring:

France, or better said, her Emperor Napoleon I, has violated the agreement with Spain; has arrested her king and forced him to abdicate, these resignations are clearly invalid [...], we declare war by land and sea on the emperor Napoleon I and on France while she is under his command and tyranny, and command all Spaniards to act against them with hostility.²¹

In the first stages, the uprising was organized by local and regional governments named *Juntas*, which contained “not only representatives of the traditional cornerstones of the *ancien regime* – nobles, military figures, clerics and bureaucrats, but also the landed commercial classes, all of whom now regarded themselves as the voice of the people.”²²

These *Juntas* acted as an almost independent government. As such they were well placed to exploit the first wave of popular enthusiasm.²³ They took command of the armies and organized the first resistance against the invasion.

Napoleon had predicted that the invasion and conquest of Spain would be easy: she appeared to be in a state of utter disintegration, with her King - Charles IV - and his prime minister – Godoy - hated by the people; possessed a decrepit army; and had a populace uneducated and controlled by corrupt clergy.²⁴ In the summer of 1808, misreading the popular character of the uprising, Napoleon took advantage of the concentration of his forces in the center of the Peninsula (while Spaniards forces were dispersed throughout the country) (see Map 3, Apex A) by sending four different corps towards Andalusia, Saragossa and Santander, Valencia, and Catalonia to attack and crush the insurgents before they could organize.²⁵ The campaign was unsuccessful; none of the objectives were accomplished.²⁶ The corps sent to Andalusia under command of General Pierre Antoine Dupond surrendered her colors to General Francisco Javier Castaños, the first defeat of the Napoleon's Army in Europe. The campaign also fed the popular uprising because of the wanton rape, looting, and destruction carried out by French troops. At the end, Joseph Bonaparte packed up his Court and retreated north to take shelter behind the Ebro River (see Map 4, Apex A), while the Spanish armies were preparing to sweep the last resistance pocket of French from Spain.²⁷

News of the Bailen defeat and withdrawal of the French army spread through Europe: In Germany, people were comparing the successful commander in the siege of Saragossa – General José de Palafox - with Arminius, the legendary German leader who defeated Romans troops in Teutoburg Forest in 9 A.D.; in Prussia, some leaders were claiming that they could do the same as the Spaniards, defeat Napoleon by a populace uprising; in Austria, advocates sought to recover the recently lost Tyrol by “stirring up a Spanish-style

uprising;”²⁸ and in England, Parliament (which till then had been planning naval action against Spanish possessions to take advantage of Spain’s weakness) changed direction by supporting the uprising and thus sent to the Peninsula the same expeditionary force that had been organized to attack Ceuta and the Spanish fleet in Mahon and Minorca.²⁹

Napoleon personally reacted by leading a French Army in a new campaign against Spain to defeat the uprising. In doing so, he criticized his commanders and their actions by declaring “I have sent the Spaniards sheep whom they have devoured; I shall send them wolves who in turn will devour them.”³⁰ He organized an army of 152,000 by diverting troops from Germany, and calling up new troops in France. At the end of October 1808, his force was at the Ebro River ready to begin the second attempt to conquer Spain.³¹

Napoleon’s plan was to march directly to Madrid while his flanking force overwhelmed the Spanish ones, and then advance toward Portugal to defeat the British. The plan was executed brilliantly: by December, Madrid was re-conquered, all the Spanish armies defeated, and the British expeditionary force, under command of Sir John Moore, forced to withdraw to and from Corunna.³² By the end of January 1809, Napoleon departed Spain convinced that she was conquered: His brother, who had been crowned king in Bayonne on 6 June 1808, was again head of the new government, and his army was mopping up the British from the Peninsula.³³

But the war was not over: the citizens of Spanish villages and towns refused to surrender to French armies, sometimes by evacuating a village before French arrived, other times by poisoning wells and burning supplies. Many young men left home to join the armies being organized in Andalusia and Galicia. These actions bought time to allow the arrival of British reinforcements³⁴ to defend Portugal and allow the rebuilding of Spanish forces. In 1809, the Spanish army conducted an unsuccessful offensive; this was followed by the French conquest of Andalusia in 1810 by taking advantage of the weakness of the British

and Spanish armies.³⁵ (see Map 5, Apex A) The guerrilla phenomena by this time, however, had become deeply rooted in the countryside; the people were stubbornly defending the pieces of territory still in Spanish hands, and slowly wearing down and demoralizing a considerable part of French forces throughout the country.

People in Arms.

Sir, I have no house, no relatives, nothing save my country and my sword. My father was led out, and shot in the market-place of my native village; our cottage was burned, my mother died of grief; and my wife, who has been violated by the enemy, fled to me, then volunteered with Palafox, and died in my arms in a hospital in Saragossa. I serve under no particular chief, I'm too miserable, I feel too revengeful to support the restraint of discipline... but I have sworn never to dress a vine or plough a field till the enemy is drive out of Spain.

Anonymous Guerrilla Warrior 5 July, 1812³⁶

When the Spanish people rose up against the armies of Napoleon after 2 May 1808, no country in Europe had less chance of victory. Spain's kings and government were in the exile, her best troops were fighting in Denmark side by side with Napoleon's armies,³⁷ the French had now defeated both the Spanish and British armies in Spain, and Napoleon's troops had captured her main fortresses.

But in direct contrast to what happened throughout the rest of Europe and to what Napoleon expected, the Spanish population responded to the defeat of their armies by deciding to continue the fight on their own. And when the population decided to rise up, they showed an overwhelming strength: confidence in their cause, and the will to defend Spanish independence. In his memoirs, the French Marshal Jean Baptiste Jourdan said:

In any other country of Europe, two victories like Medellín [28 March 1809] and Ciudad Real [26-27 March 1809] would have secured the submission of the inhabitants, and the victorious armies could have extended their conquests. In Spain the contrary occurred: the worse the regular armies' defeat, the more stubbornly the Spanish people fought; the more land the French occupied, the more dangerous the situation became for them.³⁸

This paradoxical situation can only be explained because the French were waging a war against an entire nation under arms: the defeat of its regular armies was not enough to break its will.

When the population decided to rise up, they showed an overwhelming strength: they were confident in their cause and had the will to defend Spanish independence against an outsider. Involving the entire nation, the war had the character of a national struggle for liberation from a hostile and hated alien invader. The only way to fight was armed conflict by ordinary citizens neither connected to, nor trained as, regular armies. These fighting ordinary citizens were fully supported by other citizens unable to take up arms. Sometimes the fighting was ferocious to an extreme uncommon in a classic war. In fact, Clausewitz claimed that the Peninsula War became the first “total war” of contemporary history: a War where the entire population contributed to the defeat of the enemy: a “People in Arms”.³⁹ The Baron of Jomini, in *The Art of War*, confirmed the importance of a *people in arms* to the Spanish success:

The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all the obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. What efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops of Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney, and Suchet to sustain themselves for six years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and Portuguese supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford, Blake, La Romana, Cuesta, Castaños, Reding, and Ballasteros!⁴⁰

The Spanish organized insurgence matched Clausewitz’s conditions for a successful uprising:⁴¹ The war was fought on Spanish soil; the French invasion was performed step by step, more than a year spent before the Army was able to take control of the Peninsula; the Peninsula was extensive, communications were difficult, and the terrain not easily controlled due to mountains, rivers, streams, forests, and the large number of small villages scattered throughout the country.⁴² To this must be added the unique character of the Spaniards: a long history of wars, particularly the extended invasion of the Peninsula by

Moors, had made Spaniards skillful and courageous warriors, and proud of their independence, heritage, and faith.

This war, in Spain called the Independence War, clearly had the character of a “national war.” This does not mean that in Spain there were not people willing to collaborate with “the enemy,”⁴³ but those isolated cases did not diminish the powerful opposition of the majority of the people towards the outsiders. Resistance to the invasion united men and women from all social classes. Among the guerrilla’s leaders were representatives of the nobility such as the Marquis of Atalayuelas; clerics such as the priest Jerónimo Merino; small landlords such as Francisco Espoz y Mina or the *Empecinado*; and professional soldiers like Juan Díaz Porlier and Francisco Milans del Bosch, who after their defeat found guerrilla warfare an excellent way to continue the fight. Eventually, in the Independence War, there was only one division between Spaniards: the very many who opposed the invader, and the very few who supported them, the *afrancesados*. Fifty years after the war, the Spanish author Enrique Rodríguez Solís reflected on the character of people in arms when he described the guerrillas as:

The nation in arms. They fought in the morning and worked in the afternoon. They were both soldier and citizens...; the guerrillas were the champions of our independence for seven years of incessant struggle... Though beaten from time to time, they were never vanquished... They had no other roof than the heavens, no other bed than the earth. They were the invader’s eternal shadow, his constant nightmare, an ever-present menace. They abandoned family and home and gave their life for the fatherland with joy in their hearts (...) to die a few hours later on some lonely road, and all that they asked of their fatherland (...) was a tender memory, a patch of earth, and a simple cross.⁴⁴

The formation of Guerrillas was the aftermath of the popular uprising during the first stages of the revolt.⁴⁵ They became guerrillas because guerrilla warfare was an alternative to conventional tactics and the superiority of French army in the open field. It was the only possible option after the continuous defeat of the regular armies. The rapid growth of the guerrillas was advanced by the increasing availability of defeated soldiers and small units

who, joined with civilian and charismatic leaders, organized the first such units. Later, many of the larger guerrilla groups eventually became military units that fought alongside the regular army.⁴⁶

Men and women joined the guerrillas for multiple reasons: many times, it was because of the atrocities that the French troops committed in villages and farms where women were raped, men killed, and houses and stored crops burned. During his captivity in Saint Helena years later, speaking to his old chamberlain Noel Santini, Count of Las Cases, Napoleon himself confirmed that:

The guerrillas were formed as consequence of the pillage, disorders, and abuses permitted by the marshals who disobeyed my strict orders. I had to give a warning order to shoot Soult, the most voracious of all.⁴⁷

Other times, the guerrillas joined simply to avoid serving in the baggage service of the French. But perhaps the main reason for joining the guerrillas was the strong religious feeling and spirit of independence forged in the Spanish character and tradition, and deepened by a strong local and regional feeling against the French. Due to the typical Spaniard's identification with the Catholic Church and its beliefs, an enemy of the Catholic Church was his enemy. And the Spanish Church was strongly opposed to the French Revolution and root in the "Enlightenment;" both were considered as anti-Catholic. This identification originated during the wars between the eighth and fifteenth centuries against the Moors to re-conquer the Spanish soil; it resurged during the Independence War due to the atrocities committed by French against churches, convents, and clerics during their lootings, punishment, and requisitions.⁴⁸ As Sebastian Blaze, a French apothecary who participated in the Spanish war wrote in his memoirs in 1828:

The monks skillfully employed the influence which they still enjoyed over Spanish credulity... to inflame the populace and exacerbate the implacable hatred with which they already regarded us...In this fashion they encouraged a naturally cruel and barbarous people to commit the most revolting crimes with clear conscience. They accused us of being Jews, heretics, sorcerers...As a result, just to be a Frenchman became a crime in the eyes of the country⁴⁹

Thus, the Catholic Church essentially provided the revolt with moral support and the conviction that the war was just and therefore protected and supported by God himself. Furthermore, many priests in the villages and towns provided safe haven and economic support to the guerrillas.⁵⁰ Thus, the *people in arms* character of the revolt was magnified by religious beliefs that gave the struggle a ferocity that only religious wars can do. Thus, as Jomini pointed out “Religious wars are above all the most deplorable... Wars of fanaticism are horrible when mingled with exterior war.”⁵¹

Finally, the religious feeling was amplified by strong national independence and pride: even though Spaniards may have hated him and his politics, King Charles was *their* king and his government was *their* government. They refused to accept the foreigner, as the French Lieutenant Albert Jean Michel Rocca, an officer of the 2nd Hussar Regiment, wrote in his memoirs: “the Spaniards were a nation united by a single feeling, the love for their independence, and the hatred for outsiders attempting to humiliate their national pride by forcing on them a new government.”⁵² Thus, the objective of *People in Arms* was to recover their independence, fulfilling Jomini’s definition of *National Wars*:

This name can only be applied to such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority of them, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their independence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only its camp-ground, its supplies can only be obtained at the point of the sword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured.⁵³

Guerrilla Warfare.

We must unite the strength of the army with that of the people; we must strike the weak spots in the enemy's flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and dissipation of his strength. Thus the time will come when a gradual change will become evident in the relative position of ourselves and our enemy, and when that day comes, it will be the beginning of our ultimate victory over the Japanese.

Mao Tse-tung⁵⁴

Guerrilla warfare as a technique is almost as old as conflict itself. What was different in Spain was the duration and extent of the guerrilla phenomenon, and the strategic impact that it had on Napoleon’s invasion. Spain’s strategy against Napoleon had three pillars:

first, the operations of the Spanish Army; second, support from the British Expeditionary Army; and last, but not least, guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is a phenomenon that seems paradoxical, not very well known or understood, hard to define, difficult to confront, and challenging to assess. Nevertheless, while credit for ultimate victory on the Peninsula War must be given to all three pillars, without the contribution of the guerrillas victory would have been impossible.⁵⁵ These forces and their operations produced a vital component unforeseen by Napoleon. They forced him to modify the rules of engagement, change his force deployment, and cost him the war in Spain.

Due to the presence of the guerrillas, the tactical victories over the Spanish and Anglo-Portuguese Armies were not enough for the French. Because of the guerrillas, the French had to occupy and subject the entire territory, an endeavor that, given the length and rugged topography of the Peninsula, required vast numbers of troops. Until then, Napoleon's Army had been using the technique of "*Separate to live, unite to fight.*"⁵⁶ This strategy was not possible in Spain: the rugged terrain did not permit large armies to maneuver, or to employ the enveloping tactics that had been exploited successfully by Napoleon so many times in other parts of Europe. In contrast to what was common elsewhere, the mountains in Spain often prevented the concentrations of troops; to get to many towns and villages, usually there was only one road (if even one) to gain access to the community. The towns and villages were few and poor, and usually the peasants burned their harvest and killed their cattle before the French arrived. To attempt to take control of the terrain and secure his lines of communication, Napoleon had to disperse his forces and establish many small garrisons and posts.⁵⁷ These deployments favored the activities of the guerrillas who, using the geography as a tool of war, fought against the invaders in a way very different than the French had previously confronted in Europe.⁵⁸

The guerrilla, again using his knowledge and the difficulty of the terrain, became masters of the art of ambush. French officers later candidly acknowledged the challenge they faced; French Colonel Joseph Conrad Marnier declared in his memoirs that:

A new kind of war began for us, a war of constant ambush, murder and extermination. No more battles like Eylau and Friedland, but a daily struggle against invisible enemies, thousands of them: hidden in the wilderness, in the bottom of gorges, guerrillas ready to fight in every corner of every building, with neither truce, nor rest; and always the fear of betrayal day and night, at any point, at any bend of a trail, even while we were in bed. We had to be on alert for everything and everyone, even the host who offered his house to us.⁵⁹

These constant ambushes were followed by quick retreats, which tired and demoralized the French, who exhausted manpower and resources attempting without success to capture the guerrillas. Another French officer said in his memories:

When we tried to pursue a guerrilla, the first obstacle was to know where he was. The guerrillas were never where we were looking. The peasants protected and supported them, and gave them vital information about us, and our movements. Because they only wanted partial victories...they disappeared. Then to appear later in an advantageous position; or they ran away, leaving us exhausted as we ran after them.⁶⁰

Because of their numbers and nature, the guerrillas by themselves could not recover conquered territory nor expel the invader from Spain. But they were more than adequate, even deadly, in eroding the French will and strength: Assaulting convoys and couriers, threatening and destroying French lines of communication, denying the French support of any kind from peasants and villages,⁶¹ raiding small and isolated posts, and obligating the French to constantly patrol roads and villages in order to protect their troops and their supplies. This necessitated a great number of troops in the rear. Combined with the operations of the Spanish and Anglo-Portuguese armies, these operations led to thousands of French casualties. Napoleon was forced to send more and more troops and supplies to the Peninsula, while simultaneously waging war in the Eastern Europe against Austria (1809), Prussia (1810-11), and Russia (1812-1814). When the source of new troops and supplies was depleted, the Allied Army⁶² was able to go on the offensive.

The guerrilla phenomenon evolved during the war;⁶³ guerrilla bands developed swiftly from being small groups to larger ones as they gained experience from their skirmishes with the French and reacted to their counter-guerrilla tactics. The existence of each guerrilla group was related to the specific situation of the war in its area of operation. Some guerrillas fought throughout war, but many others ceased to exist, either destroyed by the French army or reverting to bandits who waged war against French only for the valuable spoils.⁶⁴

The guerrillas fought against the French in different ways according to the situation of the war, and the specific features of each guerrilla band and area.⁶⁵ In contrast to the regular army, the guerrillas operated constantly in the enemy's rear, fighting in the vicinity of the villages where they lived and worked, and where the terrain was familiar. This hindered the French's contact with peasants, precluding requisitions, tax collections, and the gathering of supplies and food. Thus, the limits of French authority stopped where the guerrillas' started, and their strength was constantly undermined, using the expression of Mao, by:

Innumerable gnats, which, like biting a giant both in front and in rear, ultimately exhausts them. They made themselves as unendurable as a group of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find that their victim is not only exhausted but practically perishing.⁶⁶

On 28 December 1808, the Supreme Central *Junta*⁶⁷ regularized the new phenomenon of the guerrillas. It published a decree that gave them legal existence and also encouraged the creation of more guerrillas. In the preamble, the guerrillas were considered militias and were given the approval of the king.⁶⁸ These instructions had 34 articles that made reference to the equipment, draft, salary, and duties of the guerrillas. Article XXII stated that:

The purpose of the guerrillas will be intercept the enemy parties, stop their raids, prevent them from moving into the villages to collect taxes or requisition food and supplies, and smash them during their marches by shooting them from an adequate firing position.⁶⁹

The decree had the goal of giving the guerrillas legal status since the French did not consider them to be soldiers; it also provided them with some rules to avoid abuses and activities that could damage the draft and actions of the regular army, i.e. encourage soldiers to desert by offering them less painful duties. To avoid this, the instruction forbid deserters to join the guerrilla, and ordered the guerrillas to return them to the army. During the war, first the Supreme Central *Junta* and later the Counsel of Regency dictated more decrees encouraging the guerrillas (mainly to threaten lines of supplies,) and offering amnesty to all smugglers and bandits who joined the guerrillas.

The guerrillas who remained active until the end of the war operated on their own, but from time to time joined the regular army in battle. Generally they employed tactics that today would be assessed as asymmetric warfare and preserving a considerable freedom of initiative. They were able to evolve until they constituted groups structured as military units that fought coordinated first, with the Spanish Army, and then with the Wellington's Combined Army until victory was achieved. Thus, the guerrillas not only played an important role against the French rear, but ended up fighting shoulder to shoulder with regular forces. Such interaction with the regular army was later proposed by Mao Tse-tung as a natural development of guerrilla warfare:

During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.⁷⁰

Thus, during the Peninsula war, the guerrillas accomplished all of the tasks that Mao articulated more than a century later:

To exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communication; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear; to force the enemy to disperse his strength; and to coordinate all these activities with those of the regular armies on distant battle fronts.⁷¹

French Counterinsurgency Warfare.

I have traveled the whole province between Asturias and Saragossa twice...the enemy always has run away; we did not punish more of them because it is impossible find them when they do not want to fight; they always have the complete assistance of the population, and places to hide [...] the enemy does not engage in combat unless he has a numeric advantage of five or six.

February 1812, Report of General Marie-François Auguste de Caffarelli to Napoleon⁷²

Napoleon's theory of war was based on the principle that, once the main enemy forces have been destroyed on the battlefield, the "inferior forces" would fall by themselves.⁷³ The goal, then, of all his campaigns was to engage the enemy's main force in a decisive battle as he did at Ulm Austerlitz, and Jena-Auerstedt. Napoleon used speed of movement⁷⁴ of his armies to achieve a dominant battle position, while he kept his enemies off balance by maneuver⁷⁵ and artillery fire. His tactics on the battlefield were rooted in the concentrated use of artillery (to weaken or break the enemy lines, forcing openings that were exploited by infantry and cavalry); in cavalry (extensive and in depth reconnaissance); and in the intendant system (for supplies and financial management.) However, the popular Spanish uprising would stifle these tactics: Despite the fall of Madrid, the defeat of the Spanish army, and with their king and government under French control, Spaniards were still fighting. As the French officer Albert Jean Michel Rocca said in his before cited memoirs:

Even when we were winning almost all the battles, the towns of the Spanish provinces had an obstinate belief in their victory; none of them would concede that Spain had been conquered; and this feeling, within the soul of all of them, was what made this nation invincible, despite so many casualties and the frequent defeat of their armies.⁷⁶

Despite this situation, Napoleon always saw the Peninsula War as a conventional campaign. In July 1808, he wrote "the war in Spain is a struggle where the French army occupies the center and the enemy some point of the circumference."⁷⁷ Therefore, for him it was imperative to preserve the center of the Peninsula, i.e. Madrid and the lines of communication with France. Then his army could prepare for the decisive battle against what he thought was his principal enemy, the Anglo-Portuguese Army.⁷⁸

To fight against the insurgents in the conquered territories, the French army deployed as in earlier campaigns: occupy the main cities, establish control of the main roads, and deploy posts and garrisons within a day's march of the patrols and convoys.⁷⁹ However, these measures did not stop the actions of the guerrilla. Napoleon's marshals were thus forced to deploy continually more troops to secure their rear area and lines of supplies.⁸⁰

At the political level, Napoleon gave power to his brother Joseph but with limited jurisdiction and with no unity of authority throughout the territory. Napoleon established several regions north of the Ebro River under his direct control, and placed them under military governors⁸¹ who were outside his brother's authority. At the military level, Napoleon created a new special "Spanish affairs" bureau in the Ministry of War⁸² to keep the military directives under his direct authority. The French army in Spain was organized in two different forces: An "Occupation Army" under the authority of the military governor of each region with the mission to defeat the insurgency and to secure the line of communications; and the "Operation Army", composed of the best troops, able to move throughout the Peninsula, and with the mission to engage and defeat opposing regular armies (the British Expeditionary force and the Spanish Army)

Napoleon's generals approached the problem of the guerrillas by focusing on guarding their lines of communication⁸³ and concentrating their forces in the main cities, usually easy to defend because many of them were very well fortified. To protect the roads, the military governors developed "flying columns" that patrolled the roads between posts in order to locate the insurgents and then, when possible, to pursue and kill them.⁸⁴ These defensive measures sometimes worked well against the guerrillas; the later were forced to increase their size and strength in order to encounter the French with a sufficient advantage to ensure success. Both forces were thus engaged in a struggle over manpower that eventually exhausted the French who never could summon enough forces both to achieve the decisive

victory against the regular armies of Spain and Britain and to successfully wage a counterinsurgency war in the rear.⁸⁵

Thus, defensive measures employed by French were not enough to deal with a popular revolt that constantly threatened their rear, a local populace that refused to pay taxes or relinquish supplies, and an increasingly dangerous guerrilla threat, hard to find and which struck only when sure to achieve surprise and tactical superiority. The French offensive approach to guerrilla warfare became mainly kinetic and also failed: Attempting to destroy guerrilla groups when they could be found, trying to maintain constant pressure on them, and eroding the local population's support by severe reprisals after any guerrilla action.⁸⁶ But the first problem always remained: To find them, an often nearly impossible because of their knowledge of the terrain and the protection of the population.

The endless “cat and mouse” struggle produced such a high level of frustration among the French that it led to brutal reprisals against the villages.⁸⁷ Such retaliations were pursuant to the military theorist British Colonel C.E. Callwell, who claimed that when the enemy has neither capital nor army:

Your first object should be to capture whatever they prize most, and the destruction or deprivation of that which will probably bring the war more rapidly to a conclusion [...] the most satisfactory way of bringing such foes to reason is by the rifle and sword, for they understand this mode of warfare and respect it.⁸⁸

But the theory of “reprisal” will not succeed when what is “prized most” is not tangible: independence, religious freedom, national pride. Thus, the more severely the French punished the villagers, the more violent was the response and the more brutal the atrocities that the peasants and guerrillas inflicted against the soldiers who fell in their hands.⁸⁹ This approach to dealing with the insurgency had some exceptions: Marshal Bon-Adrien Jeannot de Moncey, commandant of the Observation corps of the Ocean, in charge of the east part of the Spain, wrote to Napoleon to suggest a change:

In my opinion it is necessary to change the system. We must deploy overwhelming forces and, at the same time use not only destructive measures, but some others directed to achieve peace based on reflective knowledge of the specific environment and the people's state of the mind.⁹⁰

Nevertheless, the brutality of the struggle, and the lack of unity of effort impeded the application of these measures throughout the territory, making futile the attempt to win over the populace.

Conclusions

No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a system [the National Wars] applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself. If this enemy has a regular army of respectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, what force will be sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to assure the safety of the long lines of communication against numerous bodies?

Antoine Henry, Baron the Jomini, *The Art of War*⁹¹

Why during the Peninsula War did some of the Napoleon's greatest marshals, with total disregard for his fundamental principle of concentrating the army in order to achieve the *decisive battle*, disperse their troops throughout the roads and villages of Spain so extensively that at the end only 60,000 of the 300,000 French troops in Spain (a mere 20%) were available to fight against the Allied Armies?⁹² The answer, of course, is the Counter-Insurgency War against the Spanish guerrilla. This became a mass phenomenon supported by a "nation in arms," which appeared following the popular uprising of the nation in Madrid on 2 May 1808.

The Guerrilla is the key to understanding the war and Spain's eventual victory. In the long Peninsula War, of course the combined Anglo-Portuguese army led by Wellington alongside the Spanish army had a significant role in the final victory in 1814 over part of the most preeminent army in Europe; both armies kept fighting for years, despite frequent losses and lack of unity of command. But it would be a crucial mistake not to recognize the singular role of the Spanish people and their guerrilla operations in the defeat of Napoleon's armies on

the Peninsula. Strongly supported by a populace that had bled and suffered more than it seemed anyone could bear, the guerrillas struggled relentlessly against the French throughout the country, fighting a cruel and unconventional war that slowly, but eventually, exhausted and demoralized the invader, and helped lead to his final defeat.

In accord with Clausewitz's theory, the Spanish uprising was a *People in Arms*: the French's atrocities against the populace, along with the weakness of the Spanish armies, triggered the revolt. Napoleon believed that the people would join revolutionary and "enlightened" France when promised a new King and that the changes unleashed by the French Revolution. But he critically misjudged the Spanish character: Spaniards were stubbornly proud of their independence and their religion, and Napoleon and his troops had wounded the Spaniards in their deepest beliefs and national pride. The Spanish had contempt for the invasion and the invaders, and when their army was defeated they themselves took up arms and defended their fatherland to the death. Thus provided Clausewitz later with a valuable example for his theory of war: "The stubborn resistance of the Spaniards, marred as it was by weakness and inadequacy in particulars, showed what can be accomplished by arming the people and by insurrection."⁹³

The guerrillas were the outcome of the revolt. They surfaced among people eager to find able leaders to lead them against the outsider and what he represented: Napoleonic France. The Spanish revolt was a National War. With constant pressure against the French rear, the insurgency prevented the French from concentrating enough troops to decisively defeat the regular armies opposing them, and denied them control of the roads, countryside, and villages. Their extensive and successful tactics led to the slow starvation of the French troops who became more vicious against the peasants and villagers, a practice that escalated against them and eventually strengthened the guerrillas. Finally, their actions produced an increasing demoralization: The French faced an enemy who they could not see or find, yet seemed to be

everywhere. The guerrillas overcame the overwhelming superiority of the French army by avoiding fighting in the open field; they used speed, surprise and their superior local knowledge as a weapon; while hiding among the people until tactical surprise and superiority could be achieved. The guerrillas performed, with outstanding success. Clausewitz's recognized their strengths in how to employ guerrilla forces, when he articulated a principle that:

Militia and bands of armed civilians cannot and should not be employed against the main enemy force - or indeed against any sizable enemy force. They are not supposed to pulverize the core but nibble at the shell and around the edges. They are meant to operate in areas just outside the theater of war - where the invader will not appear in strength - in order to deny him these areas altogether.⁹⁴

As the war progressed, the guerrillas evolved into larger groups, better organized and armed; they also developed improved military skills by learning from professional soldiers who joined their units after being beaten by the French army. This cooperation between guerrillas and military was addressed again by Clausewitz in his book *On War*:

That is where insurgents should build up larger units, better organized, with parties of regulars that will make them look like a proper army and enable them to tackle larger operations. From these areas the strength of the insurgency must increase as it nears the enemy's rear, where he is vulnerable to its strongest blows.⁹⁵

This cooperation increased the capabilities to the guerrillas to the point that some of them ended up as military units; thus, Spaniards accomplished, again with outstanding success, what Mao would much later describe: the evolution of the guerrilla to collaborate with the army to achieve final victory:

During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.⁹⁶

The command structure organized by Napoleon did not help the French Counter-Insurgency effort. Because of the absence of *Unity of Command* and *Unity of effort*, each

military governor fought against the insurgency on his own, without coordinating operations with the other. Moreover, the French did nothing to cultivate public support; quite the reverse, as they attempted to suppress popular support for the guerrillas by severely punishing the people after every guerrilla action. Such pillaging and reprisals put an end to any legitimacy of the French troops, proved the injustice of the French cause, and eventually broke the discipline and morale of the French soldiers. When the insurgents reacted by using fearsome tactics, Napoleon and his generals responded with even greater brutality. Troops operating in a foreign land thus engaged in a spiral of violence that could not be successful in a *National War*, where the resistance and will of the local population was always more passionate, and the local population willing to risk more than the foreign troops who always remained outsiders. Moreover, to either allow, or order, soldiers to act outside the boundaries of laws of war has a direct damaging impact on morale and discipline, and thus affects the accomplishment of their mission.

In conclusion, armies who invade a foreign country with the idea of exporting their own way of life and political organizations with force, as the French attempted to do in Spain, must first fully ground themselves in knowledge of the culture, traditions, religion, language, and character of the people of the foreign land. This knowledge must be sufficient to assure that their offensives operations, both political and military, are restricted only to the necessary employment of force but do not violate any pillar of the local people's culture, character or beliefs. Such prudent measures will facilitate reconstruction, and possibly will allow build bridges between the foreign forces and the local populace. The French in Spain did none of this; the outcome was the revolt of the populace and the eventual defeat of and withdrawal of Napoleon's armies from the Peninsula.

Endnotes

¹ José A. Cabeza de Osmá, *La Guerra de Independencia* (Madrid: Espasa, 2002), 92. Author's translation.

² FMFRP 12-18 *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington DC: USMC HQ, 1989), 54.

³ Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte Hélène* I (Paris: 1842), 693.

⁴ The proclamation was spread throughout the towns and villages around Madrid, and the regions of Extremadura and Andalusia, where the main body of the Spanish army was positioned. Roberto A. Scattolin. *The Inheritance of History: Ethics, Warfare, and the Bando of Móstoles in 1808 Spain*. Website: *The Napoleon Series*, last accessed: December 21st 2010; <http://www.napoleon-series.org/>

⁵ “If Trafalgar had a winner in every sense, it was the United Kingdom. By this naval victory, the British society was assured that any attempt by Napoleon to invade her island was impossible.” José G. Cayuela and José Ángel Gallego, *La Guerra de la Independencia: historia bélica, pueblo y nación en España (1808-1814)* (Salamanca: Ed. Salamanca, 2002), 48. Author's translation.

⁶ “The Continental System - a boycott of British exports - sought to achieve this by bringing the nation of shopkeepers to its knees through economic strangulation, rather than by direct, military confrontation” David Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer* (New York: Arnold, 1986), 5.

⁷ Charles J. Esdaile, *The Peninsula War* (London: Palgrave, 2003), 5.

⁸ Esdaile, *The Peninsula War*, 7-8.

⁹ Esdaile, *The Peninsula War*, 7.

¹⁰ Cayuela and Gallego, *La Guerra de la Independencia: historia bélica, pueblo y nación en España*, 75.

¹¹ Esdaile, *The Peninsula War*, 30-31.

¹² Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer*, 10.

¹³ Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer*, 11.

¹⁴ Rory Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1805-1815* (London: Yale, 1996), 32.

¹⁵ Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1805-1815*, 32.

¹⁶ Cayuela and Gallego, *La Guerra de la Independencia: historia bélica, pueblo y nación en España*, 78.

¹⁷ Cayuela and Gallego, *La Guerra de la Independencia: historia bélica, pueblo y nación en España*, 86.

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- ¹⁸ Esdaile, *The Peninsula War*, 12.
- ¹⁹ Fernando Martínez-Laínez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos. Los Guerrilleros en la Guerra de Independencia (1808-18014)*(Madrid: Algaba, 2007), 56. Author's translation.
- ²⁰ “*Guerra de la Independencia Española 1808-1814*”; <http://www.1808-1814.org/>
- ²¹ Martínez-Laínez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 57. Author's translation.
- ²² David Gates, *The Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815*, (London: Arnold, 1997), 172.
- ²³ Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon*, 34.
- ²⁴ Esdaile, *The Peninsula War*, 29-30.
- ²⁵ Esdaile, *The Peninsula War*, 66-67.
- ²⁶ The objectives of the campaign were: (1) Seize Andalusia, her capital, Seville, and the ports. (2) Take control of Saragossa, and (3) Catalonia and East coast, specifically Valencia and Alicante. In the campaign Murat lost Dupont corps (25,000 soldiers), suffered 3,500 casualties in the unsuccessful siege of Saragossa, and had light losses in Catalonia where 700 soldiers were wounded or killed. “*The Napoleon Series*”.
- ²⁷ Richard Humble, *Napoleon's Peninsula Marshal* (New York: Taplinger, 1973), 79.
- ²⁸ Esdaile, *The Peninsula War*, 85-86.
- ²⁹ Major-General Brent Spencer was in command of the expeditionary force of 5,000 troops that had planned to operate against Spanish interests. This force was the first available to aid the Spaniards when Parliament decided on June 8th to reverse its strategy. At the end of June, Spencer, deployed in Gibraltar, offered his assistance to Castaños, General of Andalusia's army. At the same time, a naval squadron was ordered to protect the Spanish coast; another fleet rescued the Spanish troops of the Marquis of la Romana then fighting alongside Napoleon's troops in Denmark. Also, a major expeditionary force was assembled in Cork under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley (later Duke of Wellington.) Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon*, 35-42.
- ³⁰ Humble, *Napoleon's Peninsula Marshal*, 79.
- ³¹ Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon*, 90.
- ³² January 16-17 1809. During the Battle of Elviña, the Commander-in- Chief of the English Expeditionary Army, Sir John Moore, was mortally wounded and died some days later. He was buried in Corunna. Sir Arthur Wellesley was soon thereafter appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Army. Cayuela and Gallego, *La Guerra de la Independencia: historia bélica, pueblo y nación en España*, 191-193.
- ³³ Muir notes that Napoleon made many mistakes. One was that he “designated no supreme commander - not even the freshly-restored King Joseph. He himself would continue to issue overriding orders for the prosecution of the war in Spain, with disastrous results.” Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon*, 93.

³⁴ After disembarkation of the expeditionary force of 16,000 troops in Lisbon on 22 April 1809, the main goal of Sir Arthur Wellesley was to sweep the French out of Portugal, and to link up with the Spanish armies in Andalusia. Both aims were accomplished by May 1810. Humble, *Napoleon's Peninsula Marshal*, 104-107.

³⁵ The "immediate sequel (following the retreat of Marshal Soult from Portugal) was the French conquest of the south of Spain, taking them to the gates of Cadiz. This period - May 1809-February 1810 - lowered the Allies' fortunes in the Peninsula War to their lowest ebb since Napoleon's invasion of Spain in November 1808". Humble, *Napoleon's Peninsula Marshal*, 106.

³⁶ John Sherer *Recollections of the Peninsula*, (London: Logman, 1825), 248. The guerrilla was a native from Aragon who the author found three leagues from Pamplona, when he asked where he lived.

³⁷ In 1807, King Charles IV agreed to provide a divisional force to bolster French army contingents in Germany; this auxiliary division of the North was headed by a talented General-officer named Don Pedro Caro y Sureda, Marquis of The Romana. "*The Napoleons Series*"

³⁸ Cited by Martínez-Láinez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 28.

³⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). In the Book 6, chapter 26: *people in Arms*, the Author address this type of war, in which "the whole nation renders armed resistance".

⁴⁰ Antoine H. of Jomini *The Art of the War* (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1971), 32-33.

⁴¹ (1) The war must be fought in the interior of the country. (2) It must not be decided by a single stroke. (3) The theater of operations must be fairly large. (4) The national character must be suited to that type of war. (5) The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, or forest, marshes, or the local methods of cultivation (6) Fought as part of a large campaign plans, under an overall commander. Clausewitz, *On War*, 480.

⁴² "As is constantly restated, both Spain and Portugal are countries ideally suited to guerrilla warfare. Not only are there wide regions that are extremely rugged, if not downright mountainous ... thereby ensuring that time after time even main roads are forced to cross precipitous mountain passes or to run through lengthy gorges of the most terrifying nature... indeed, many mountain villages can only be reached via defiles that are miles long, walled in by sheer cliff and only a few feet wide... Even where the country is not particularly elevated, it is in many areas covered with the dense scrub known as *matorral* [bush], or thickly dotted with pines and Holm oaks. And last but not least, in many parts of the country human settlement is relatively infrequent, with the result that it is difficult to establish an adequate network of garrisons and police post." Charles J. Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon. Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain 1808-1814* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2004), 28.

⁴³ The Spaniards who collaborated with Joseph Bonaparte included those who believed in the Enlightenment ideas and thought that he was the solution to the problems of Spain. They were known as *afrancesados*, a term considered an insult by the people who used it to refer to whomever had good relations with the French, or participated by any means in the

government of cities under French control. But many politicians, clergy, nobility and scholars who supported Napoleon in the first stages of the struggle rejected him after the atrocities committed by French troops. Another factor was the Napoleonic decision to annex the territories of Catalonia, Aragon, Navarra, and Vizcaya to France. Nevertheless, some remained with Napoleon until the end and went into exile in France after the war.

⁴⁴ Enrique Rodríguez Solís, *Los Guerrilleros de 1808. Historia Popular de la Guerra de la Independencia*. (Madrid: Fernando Cao y Domingo Val, 1887), Author's translation.

⁴⁵ "The populace did not tolerate a desire to discard the laws and customs of obligation; many sought revenge for all their compatriots killed, and to free their country from the violent usurpation that the French were trying to impose. When there was an obstacle to their magnanimous passion, they became impatient and unmanageable...; they were anxious to be led by anyone committed to lead them, and nobody yearned to be promoted because it." Robert Southey, *History of the Peninsular War*, London, 1823-1832. Cited by Martínez-Laínez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*. Author's translation.

⁴⁶ "The defeat and dispersion of the soldiers determined the development and praxis of the guerrillas ... Some of them were formed from elements of the defeated regular armies, which some civilians joined under command of some officers; other were formed by civilian themselves, isolated soldiers, and deserters under the command of people who acted outside of the military discipline, even though many of them eventually began using the rules and grades of the regular armies" Antonio Moliner Prada, *La Guerrilla en la Guerra de Independencia* (Madrid: Ministry of Defense, 2004), 27. Author's translation.

⁴⁷ Words recorded by Les Cases and published in London two years after the death of Napoleon as *Memories of Saint Elena*. Cited by Martínez-Laínez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 87.

⁴⁸ The Catholic hierarchy initially did not support the uprising because of concern about the revolt, the murder, and anarchy that is the usually the result of the popular revolts. (Martínez-Laínez, in his book *Como Lobos Hambriento*, page 73, points out that the Counsel of Inquisition condemned the uprising, and many bishops sent letters to their parishes encouraging the people to be calm). But as the war progressed, the situation changed until the uprising had the bishops almost total support.

⁴⁹ Cited by Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon. Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain*, 63.

⁵⁰ Martínez-Laínez recorded many requests for funds made by the clergy to support the guerrillas of their villages and towns. There are many examples of priests designated as chaplains to the guerrillas by the Spanish Church and passed by the *Juntas*. Martínez-Laínez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 76-78.

⁵¹ Jomini *The Art of the War*, 35.

⁵² Moliner, *La Guerrilla en la Guerra de Independencia* , 101. Author's translation

⁵³ Jomini *The Art of the War*, 29.

⁵⁴ FMFRP 12-18 *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*. 68.

⁵⁵ José Pardo de Santayana. *Francisco de Longa, de Guerrillero a General en la Guerra de Independencia*. Last accessed January 2011; <http://www.leynfor.com/longa/libro.html>.

⁵⁶ As a general rule, Napoleon dispersed his corps on the march so that they were in mutually supporting positions and able to come to the aid of each other in the event of concentration for battle or to ward off superior forces. This emphasized Napoleon's dictum of march divided, fight united. In a letter to Eugene Beauharnais in 1809 the Emperor highlighted his belief in the tactical advantages of the corps system: "Here is the principle of war - a corps of 25,000-30,000 men can be left on its own. Well handled, it can fight or alternatively avoid action, and maneuver according to circumstances without any harm coming to it, because an opponent cannot force it to accept an engagement, but if it chooses to do so, it can fight alone for a long time." *"The Napoleon Series"*.

⁵⁷ Maj Mark A. Reeves, USA, "The Iberian Leech: Napoleon's Counterinsurgency Operations in the Peninsula 1808-1810." (MMS, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004), 69.

⁵⁸ Reeves, *"Napoleon's Counterinsurgency Operations in the Peninsula 1807-1810"*, 60.

⁵⁹ Martínez-Laínez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 187. Author's translation.

⁶⁰ Martínez-Laínez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 184. Author's translation.

⁶¹ Marshal Jourdan states in his memoirs that "the guerrillas were not content just to attack French patrols; their chiefs required the mayors of towns and villages not occupied by the French to permit requisitions only when carried out by Spanish forces. They kidnapped anybody too sympathetic with the French; they murdered, or mutilated anyone who neglected to warn them when the French were approaching, or were suspected of having informed about them." Martínez-Laínez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 109. Author's translation.

⁶² In 1812, both armies were placed under command of the Duke of Wellington, becoming a Combined Army.

⁶³ According to Ruiz and using the evolution of the war as a criterion, the guerrilla warfare had four periods: (1) Formation, predominance of the conventional war. This period ended when the Supreme Central *Junta* moved to Seville under pressure of the advance of Napoleon at the end of 1808. (2) From 27 December 1808 (when the Supreme Central *Junta* published the first regulations to the guerrillas) to 19 November 1809. This period ended with the battle of Ocaña. During this period, the guerrillas coexisted with two types of war: conventional and siege of cities. (3) Between the battles of Ocaña and Arapiles. The apogee of guerrillas, when the guerrillas best accomplished their mission of stalking the enemy and preventing the collaboration by the people. (4) After the Battle of Arapiles to the end of the war. It is the emergence of the guerrillas effectiveness as they joined the regular armies which had regained the initiative against French. Enrique Martínez Ruíz "Las Guerrillas en la Guerra de Independencia" *Militaria: Journal of Military Culture*. Madrid Complutense University, n° 7. 1995.

⁶⁴ "Many of them [the guerrillas] under the pretence of patriotism and of serving against the enemy became regular freebooters and subsisted on the pillage of the country." Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon. Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain*, 23.

⁶⁵ Attending to their importance and numbers, the guerrillas can be classified in three different groups. (1) The largest guerrillas bands, which were organized as military units, whose chiefs became famous in Spain and eventually held military ranks recognized by the army (like Juan Martín Díaz “*El Empecinado*”, Espoz y Mina, or the priest Merino); those guerrillas acted in vast areas, and many times joined regular army for battles. (2) The group of regional guerrillas, with fewer members and a limited range of activity (guerrillas like Manso y Solá, Renovales, Porlier); or (3) local militias like *Somatén* in Catalonia were the more dispersed and uncontrolled, only organized for actions as needed, as the opportunity to ambush or kill the enemy appeared. Ruíz “*Las Guerrillas en la Guerra de Independencia*”

⁶⁶ FMFRP 12-18 *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, 54.

⁶⁷ The number and diversity of local *Juntas* necessitated a process of unification in order to coordinate efforts and to accomplish the goals of the revolt. The new Supreme Central *Junta* was established in Aranjuez on 25 September 1808 and was appointed by the monarchy as the only legitimate governing body. The Supreme Central *Junta* was transformed into the Counsel of Regency on 29 January 1810. Ruíz “*Las Guerrillas en la Guerra de Independencia*”, 245.

⁶⁸ The Supreme Central *Junta* considered that Ferdinand VII was King. They did not recognize his abdication by Napoleon, considering that an illegal action having been obtained under coercion. Rodríguez Solís, *Los Guerrilleros de 1808*, 134.

⁶⁹ Rodríguez Solís, *Los Guerrilleros de 1808*, 83-84. Author's translation.

⁷⁰ FMFRP 12-18 *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, 42.

⁷¹ FMFRP 12-18 *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, 53.

⁷² Napoleon (who was at that time was in Germany) seemed unable to comprehend the situation in Spain. He complained to Generals Reille (Navarra) and Cafarelli (Vasconia), how it was possible that, after 18 months in Spain each one with 100,000 soldiers, they were unable to conquer the guerrillas? Napoleon then had 235,000 soldiers in the Peninsula; however more than half of them were involved in counterinsurgency operations and guarding the rear. Website “*The Napoleon Series*. ”

⁷³ All of Napoleon's forces, and his strategic maneuvering were focused on the specific goal of engaging the opposing army in a decisive battle where it would be destroyed. This strategy was in opposition to Napoleon's eighteenth century forerunners who made a great distinction between maneuver and battle, a legacy that many of his opponents had yet to overcome. These principles of speed, offensive action, and concentration at the decisive point often led to Napoleon's opponents being both surprised and demoralized. This was essential as Napoleon's first priority in a campaign was the destruction of the enemy army in the field; everything else was secondary. Website “*The Napoleon Series*. ”

⁷⁴ The emphasis on speed and mobility contributed greatly to the confusion and distress of his opponents. A French infantryman best summed up this aspect of Napoleonic warfare: "The Emperor has discovered a new way of waging war; he makes use of our legs instead of our bayonets." This was epitomized in the first Italian campaign when General Augereau's corps marched 50 miles in 36 hours. In 1805 Napoleon moved the whole of the Grand Army,

210,000 men from its camps at Boulogne to the Rhine. From the Rhine he marched to the Danube, and then to the outskirts of Ulm in 17 days. Marshal Soult's corps covered 275 miles during a period of 22 days. At Austerlitz, Davout drove his corps 140 kilometers in 48 hours to join the battle and gain a decisive victory for the French. Website "The Napoleon Series."

⁷⁵ Napoleon used three main strategic concepts to create the necessary favorable battle position. Firstly, there was the indirect approach or *La manœuvre sur les derrières*, employed more than thirty times between 1796 and 1815. This maneuver entailed trapping the enemy by a feint attack and then marching by a concealed route, either natural or by cavalry screen, to fall on the enemy's rear or flank. This maneuver proved to be Napoleon's most successful stratagem, and it was only after a decade, and a dozen major defeats, that his opponents developed a countermeasure. Secondly, when faced by two or a series of enemy armies, Napoleon favored the "central position." This meant that, although he might be inferior in numbers to the enemy, he would engage each enemy element separately to achieve battlefield superiority. During the Waterloo campaign, when faced with two opposing armies, Napoleon first attacked Blücher's Prussians, while Marshal Ney's Corps skirmished with Wellington. After Blücher's defeat, Napoleon turned all his attention on Wellington's Anglo-Dutch Army. The third Napoleonic maneuver was "strategic penetration:" smashing the enemy's corridor of defenses, followed by a rapid march deep into enemy territory to seize a city or town to be then used as a base of operations for the next phase of the campaign. Website "*The Napoleon Series*."

⁷⁶ José Gómez Arce, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia Militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, Volume I (Madrid: Crédito Comercial, 1868), 159. Author's translation.

⁷⁷ Napoleon's letters, 21 July 1808. Cited by Martínez-Láinez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 119. Author's translation.

⁷⁸ The Baron de Marbot provided an example of this recurring problem when he described the state of affairs borne by Marshal Soult: "Under a mistaken belief that turned out to be disastrous, Napoleon never understood that the Spanish and Portuguese insurrection created an enormous difference between the reported number of French troops in the Peninsula, and the actual number of combatants there that could be brought to bear against the enemy. Thus the strength of the II Corps under Soult numbered 47,000; but, after deducting the garrisons at Santander, Corunna, and Ferrol, the 8,000 men employed to maintain communications, and the 12,000 sick, those present under arms did not exceed 25,000, and these were exhausted from fighting all through the winter in a mountainous country; often short of shoes and provisions; and had only broken down horses to drag the artillery over bad roads. It was with such feeble means that the Emperor ordered Marshal Soult to enter Portugal." Marcellin Marbot, *The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot* (London: Greenhill Books, 1988, 2 vols), II, 88.

⁷⁹ General Suchet created an elaborate system to safeguard his rear areas: "A connected series of fortified posts... had been established all along the principal roads, which served at the same time as lines of operation and communication. Their object was to ensure the safety of troops in charge of the passage of couriers, and to protect isolated and detached parties, as well as to see to the furnishing of provisions, the collection of contributions the whole of this army of stations which [we] were compelled to leave in our rear amounted to about 12,000 men." Suchet, *Memoirs of War in Spain*, 190. Cited by Reeves, "*Napoleon's Counterinsurgency Operations in the Peninsula 1807-1810*", 70.

⁸⁰ “The need for security was true for the stationary French occupation forces as well. In the fall of 1810, General Reille had 4,700 troops occupying the province of Navarre. However, he could only utilize 2,000 troops for field duty as 2,700 soldiers were required for garrison duty.” Reeves, *“Napoleon’s Counterinsurgency Operations in the Peninsula 1807-1810”*, 70.

⁸¹ On February 8, 1810 Napoleon established four territories (Catalonia, Aragon, Navarra, and Vizcaya) outside the authority of his brother Joseph regarding military issues and taxes. In addition, the taxes collected in the provinces of Salamanca, Zamora, Asturias, Santander, Burgos, Valladolid, and Palencia were sent to the military Intendant. Martínez-Láinez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 149.

⁸² Reeves, *“Napoleon’s Counterinsurgency Operations in the Peninsula 1807-1810”*, 92.

⁸³ “In accordance with the laws of war, any general who lost his line of communication deserves death” Napoleon’s letters, 21 July 1808. Cited by Martínez-Láinez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 119. Author's translation.

⁸⁴ Reeves, *“Napoleon’s Counterinsurgency Operations in the Peninsula 1807-1810”*, 71.

⁸⁵ “Between October 1808 and October 1812, the number of French soldiers in Spain was about 354,000 including 259,000 troops, while the regular Allied army at its height (Spanish and Anglo-Portuguese) was about 160,000. However, in the decisive battles as Busaco (1810), La Albuera (1811), los Arapiles (1812), and Vitoria (1813), the French Army rarely had more than 60,000 soldiers on the battlefield. The rest of the forces were unavailable as they were occupying the country, and guarding the lines of communication.” Miguel Artola, *“La Guerra de Guerrillas”* Revista de Occidente 10 (1996). Author's translation.

⁸⁶ The spiral of vengeance impacted all the suspects, including their families and relatives. The French arrested the parents, husbands, wives, and sons of the guerrilla members that they could find, as well as those that refused taxes. To stop the forced draft that the guerrillas sometimes imposed upon the peasants, and the kidnapping of French persons and *afrancesados*, General Buquet in 1812 ordered, “whenever an inhabitant is taken from his house, three of his relatives will be immediately put under arrest; if the kidnapped person dies, the hostages will be shot immediately, without court martial.” Artola, *“La Guerra de Guerrillas,”* 16. Author's translation.

⁸⁷ “The French - wrote De La Rocca, an officer of the 2nd Hussar Regiment- could not survive in Spain except by terror; they were always eager to reprove the guilty by punishing the innocent, and to take revenge on the strong by reprisals against the weak. Looting had become essential to survival.” Martínez-Láinez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 30. Author's translation.

⁸⁸ Colonel C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars. The Principles & Practice* (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 40-41

⁸⁹ “As the French army was fatigued by hunger, they resorted to devastation, and as they could not bear to be killed by the covert foe named the guerrillas, they resorted to cruelty, never realizing that eventually they will be the victims: they were mere soldiers of an army, but the Spaniards were a whole nation. Villages in arms did not fight battles, but they destroyed bridges, blockaded roads, burned mills and stored crops, and even the villages

themselves; this is the art that Spaniards taught the Russians. The brother murdered, the daughter raped, the father shot, produced bloody reprisals.” Cesare Cantú. Cited by Martínez-Laínez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 126. Author's translation.

⁹⁰ Cited by Martínez-Laínez, *Como Lobos Hambrientos*, 121. Author's translation.

⁹¹ Jomini, *The Art of War*, 32.

⁹² “In 1810, for example, when Massena invaded Portugal, the Imperial forces in the Peninsula totaled a massive 325,000 men, but only about 1/4 of these could be spared for the offensive - the rest [3/4] were required to contain the Spanish insurgents and regulars. This was the greatest single contribution that the Spaniards were to make and, without it, Wellington could not have maintained himself on the continent for long - let alone emerges triumphant from the conflict” Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer*, 33-34.

⁹³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 220.

⁹⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 481.

⁹⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 481.

⁹⁶ FMFRP 12-18 Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare.

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Note to the reader: Translations from the Spanish books, journals and websites are by the author.

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Callwell, Sir Charles Eduard. *Small Wars*. Lincon: University of Nebraska Press, 1906.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Princenton: Princenton University Press, 1976.

Jomini, Antoine H. of *The Art of the War*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971

12-18, FMFRP. *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*. Washington: USMC HQ, 1988.

SECUNDARY

Books

Alonso Moreno, Manuel. *La batalla de Bailén: el surgimiento de una nación*. Madrid: Silex, 2008.

Even though focus of the book is in on the Bailen battle, in the first chapter the author has a great description of the events that lead the Spanish uprising against Napoleon. It provides an accurate analysis of the character of the revolt. The book is written in Spanish.

Atteridge, A. Hilliard. *Marshal Murat. Marshal of France and King of Naples*. New York: Thomas Nelson & sons, Ltd. 1911? (no Dated)

The book addresses the life of Murat, his military and personal achievements, and his relationship with Napoleon. Chapter 12 has a brief description of the actions of Murat and the correspondence with Napoleon since he was appointed as Commander-in-chief of French troops in the Iberian Peninsula till his next duty as a King of Naples in the summer of 1808. The book reflects the wrong assessment that Murat made on regarding of the Spaniard uprising.

Chandler, David G. *The Campaigns of Napoleon. Volume II. The Zenith. September 1805-September 1812*. London: The Folio Society 2002, 1966.

A vast work which in the part eleven describes the initial campaigns in Portugal and Spain. In chapters 59 to 61 Chandler explains with accuracy how Napoleon reacted to the Spanish uprising and the military operations which ended up with Napoleon convinced that the “Spanish business” was over. In the chapter 61, Chandler makes an accurate analysis of the Spanish situation after this campaign and points out Napoleon’s mistakes and wrong assumptions.

Blaze, Elzéar, Captain of the French army. *Life in the Napoleon’s Army. The Memoirs of the Captain Eléar Blaze*. London: Green Books, 1995.

In the chapter five the author describes how the French viewed the Spaniards, highlighting the proud, stubbornness, and poverty of the people. He describes the

problems that the French faced in collecting supplies for the troops and how annoying was life in Spain in comparison with elsewhere in Europe.

Esdaile, Charles J. *Fighting Napoleon. Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain 1808-1814*. Yale University Press, 2004.

Very interesting book in which the author critiques the character of the Spanish revolt as a *National war* or *People in Arms*. Furthermore, Esdaile claims that the guerrillas' actions were not decisive in the defeat of Napoleon. Even though I do not agree with his thesis, his arguments forced me to enhance my argument and find more sources to support own interpretation.

Esdaile, Charles J. *The Peninsula War*. London: Palgrave. MacMillan, 2003.

Vast work which covers the entire war in the Peninsula. Even though it is focused on regular warfare, there are good points and references regarding the guerrillas actions. The book is based on primary sources.

Cayuela Fernández, José G. and José Ángel Gallego Palomares. *La Guerra de la Independencia: historia bélica, pueblo y nación en España (1808-1814)*. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2008.

Cayuela and Palomares make a profound study of the Spanish war and try to ascertain the causes of the Spanish revolt, the causes and outcomes of the guerrillas, and the actions of the regular armies, as well as the role played by the British expeditionary army. The book is written in Spanish.

Fraser, Ronald. *La Maldita Guerra de España, Historia Social de la Guerra de Independencia 1808-1814*. Barcelona: Ed. Crítica, 2006.

The appendix 4 provide multiple data with regard to the guerrillas; their composition, figures, operations bases, number of guerrillas in each region, and many others.

Gates, David. *The Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815*. London: Arnold, 1997.

The author summarizes in chapter eight the Peninsula war from the point of view of the British army, and the role than the guerrillas and the Spaniards played the war against Napoleon.

Gates, David. *The Spanish Ulcer*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986.

The book is one of the essential British references about the Spanish war. In the introduction and second chapter Gates makes a useful description of the political and social situation in 1808. He provides on accurate portrayal of the forces, military tactics, and how Napoleon's army acted in Spain. The section V of the second chapter – the Spanish People in Arms - makes good points to sustain the thesis and conclusions of this paper.

Gómez Arteché, José. *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia Militar de España de 1808 a 1814. Vol I*. Madrid: Imprenta del Crédito Comercial, 1868.

Gomez Arteché was a senior Spanish military army; in his book he addressed the history of the Spanish war from a military perspective, highlighting the role played by the guerrillas and Spanish population within the character of independence struggle against French invasion. The book is written in Spanish.

Humble, Richard. *Napoleon's Peninsula Marshals*. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co. Inc., 1973.

Humble covers the history of the Spanish war from the point of view of different Napoleon's Marshals who commanded troops in the Spanish theater. He shows the disputes and the lack of unity of command as a result of the arguably bad decision of Napoleon of not giving his brother Joseph full command – politically and military - of his forces in the Peninsula.

Liddell Hart, Basil. *Strategy*. New York: Meridien, 1991

The author where addresses in the book his theory of the *Indirect Approach*. The book shows many examples taken from the campaigns along the history to defend his theory.

Martínez Láinez, Fernando. *Como lobos hambrientos. Los guerrilleros en la Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1814)*. Madrid: Algaba Ediciones, 2007.

This book has been my main source regarding of guerrilla phenomenon, its organization and evolution. It is a brilliant study of the guerrilla, its causes and outcomes. The second half traces the events of the different guerrilla groups in Spain with regard to the different regions and gives a view of the personalities and complexities of the main guerrilla leaders. The book is written in Spanish.

Martínez-Ruiz, Enrique. *La Guerra de la Independencia Española (1808-1814) Claves españolas en la crisis europea*. Madrid: Siléx, 2007.

Chapter three of this book makes a good analysis of the different wars that were waged, the regular and de irregular, as well as the character of the war and the effect of the guerrilla in the aftermath of the war. The book it is written in Spanish.

Moliner Prada, Antonio. *La Guerrilla en la Guerra de Independencia*. Madrid: Ministry of Defense, 2004.

The book is a study of the actions of the guerrillas in the Spanish war, their causes, and their outcomes. The author describes the main actions accomplished by the guerrillas and their relations with the different local and central governments, and the army. The book it is written in Spanish.

Muir, Rory. *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1805-1815*. new Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1996.

The book shows a unique British perspective of the Spanish war and her different approaches to the war in the Iberian Peninsula. The interpretation looks at events in Spain and the results, to include the effects in other war theatres as Russia or Germany.

Pardo de Santayana, José. *Francisco de Longa, de Guerrillero a General en la Guerra de la Independencia*. Madrid: Leynfor Siglo XXI, 2007.

The book is focused on one of the guerrilla leaders who became senior officer in the Spanish army at the end of the war. In the introduction and the first chapter the author defend the character of *National War* of the Spanish uprising. The book is written in Spanish.

Ruiz Solís, Enrique. *Los Guerrilleros de 1808. Historia Popular de la Guerra de la Independencia*. Madrid: Fernando Cao & Domingo Val, 1887

The book was written a few years after the end of the war. It is a detailed description of the guerrilla actions in the war. The author provides descriptions of the main guerrilla leaders, their motivations, failures and success.

Essays, Journals, and Articles

Artola, Miguel. "La Guerra de Guerrillas." *Revista de Occidente*, n° 10 (1963): 12-43.

The article highlights the importance of the guerrillas in the Spanish war and their contribution to the Napoleon's defeat by showing interesting examples of different guerrilla leaders. The article is written in Spanish.

Dugdale-Pointon, TDP. (3 March 2002), *Peninsular War (1807-14)*,
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_peninsular.html

Martínez Ruíz, Enrique. "Las Guerrillas en la la Guerra de Independencia." *Militaria: Revista de Cultura Militar. Universidad Complutense de Madrid*, n° 7. 1995.

The article is an essay about the role played by the guerrillas in the Spanish war against Napoleon. The author claims that the guerrilla played an essential role in denying Napoleonic forces the control of the terrain and, therefore, their capacity to taxes collect, and provide supplies to the troops. The article is written in Spanish.

Reeves, Marck A. "The Iberian Leech: Napoleon's Counterinsurgency. Operations in the Peninsula 1808-1810." <http://www.dtic.mil>. 2004. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA437049> (accessed January 8, 2011).

An academic work from an officer of the US Army who analyzes the attempted tactical solutions that Napoleon's generals employed towards the guerrilla phenomenon in the Spanish war.

Scattolin, Roberto A. *The Inheritance of History: Ethics, Warfare, and the Bando of Móstoles in 1808 Spain*. Website: *The Napoleon Series*, last entry: December 21st 2010; <http://www.napoleon-series.org/> (accessed January, 2011).

The article addresses the response of Spaniards against the French attempt to conquer the Peninsula, analyzing the causes of the Napoleon's defeat.

Website

Baltimore Theacher. Social Estudios Teaching & Learning.
<http://baltimoreteacher.com/docs/wh/7/1-06.pdf?498>(accessed January 2011)
Educational website with a complete chronology of the Peninsula War

Guerra de la Independencia Española 1808-1814. [Http://www.1808-1814.org/](http://www.1808-1814.org/) (accessed November 2010)

Website built by many supporters of the Spanish war taking advantage of the 200th anniversary of the war. The website has many articles, all of them properly endnoted. The sources are manly Spanish and some are from books translated into Spanish. The site is currently adding new articles and news reports. All the information is available in Spanish.

Napoleon, His Army and Enemies. [Http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/](http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/) (accessed December, 2010).

A wide selection of articles on Napoleon's campaigns. The articles are augmented with pictures and video clips extracted from movies. The articles include quotations.

Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars Homepage.

[Http://www.historyofwar.org/napoleon/index.html](http://www.historyofwar.org/napoleon/index.html) (accessed October-November 2010).


An extensive collection of articles about all the Napoleonic wars. The majority of the articles on the Spanish War use as their main sources Esdaile, *The Spanish Ulcer*, and the large work of Charles Oman *A History of the Peninsula War*. (accessed January 2011)

The Napoleons Series. 1995-2010. [Http://www.napoleon-series.org/](http://www.napoleon-series.org/) (accessed october-november de 2010)


Website proclaims “The Napoleon Series is dedicated to the free exchange of ideas and information with good will, intellectual integrity, and respect for divergent perspectives, journeying in international fellowship to probe and illuminate the history of an era whose reverberations still echo today”. The site has many different articles and sources.

APPENDIX A

MAPS[‡]




Map 1. French-Spanish invasion of Iberian Peninsula in 1807-8




Map 2. Disposition of forces in 1808 after Murat invasion.


[‡] Maps elaborated by the Author



Map 3. Counterattack on Spanish Army and Disembark of British Exp Force in Portugal (1808)



Map 4. Napoleon's actions Nov 1808-Jan 1809



Map 5. Situation in Dec 1810

APPENDIX B

FIGURES

Forces present in the Peninsula.

REGULAR ARMIES

According with to David Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer*, the regular troops present in the Peninsula were:

YEAR	SPANISH ARMY	ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY	FRENCH ARMY
1808	76,000		165,120 Initial invasion force 278,670 Napoleon's Campaign
1809	191,997	20,641	195,021 Effective - 56,000 sick
1810	Unknown	71,323	292,912 Effectives - 27,862 Sick
1811	98,405	Unknown	291,414 Effectives - 63047 sick
1812	160,000	51,949	213,966 Effectives - 35,650 sick
1813	Unknown	63,132	156,000 Effectives - 18,650 sick

GUERRILLAS

With regard to Guerrillas, there is no unanimity among scholars regarding the number of guerrillas, or how many guerrilla groups participated in the war; however, depending on the source, the numbers range from 25,000 to 60,000. Accurate numbers are almost impossible to establish due to the nature of these groups, the absence of any record except for those guerrillas eventually recognized as regular forces, and the unknown number that had a short life, either because they later joined larger groups, or they were destroyed or ceased to exist. Moreover, even with regard to the larger groups linked to regular military units, there is only

partial knowledge: accurate numbers are difficult to determine since the units changed back and forth, and up and down during the war. With these reservations, Antonio Moliner Prada in his book *La Guerrilla en la Guerra de la Independencia*, citing an official report of Charles Stuart (an intelligence officer of Wellington) dated in 13 July 1811, estimates that there were 100 guerrilla groups in 1811, with over 28,000 members. Moliner concludes that when other groups not included in the British report are added, the total number of the active Guerrillas in 1811 was about 35,000 men. This number is increased to 50,000 by another Spanish author, Gómez Arteché. Charles Esdaile in his book, *The Peninsula War*, points out that the number of guerrilla warriors in 1812 were 38,500 “according to a press report that circulated very widely at the end of 1812.”

Finally, the definitive work of Ronald Fraser, “*La Maldita Guerra de España*”⁹⁷ provides the tables below, where he divides the guerrilla groups according to size:

1811					
	Large (more than 1,000)	Intermediate (250-999)	Small (till 249)	Unknown	Total
Guerrillas groups	16	11	29	56	112
Guerrilla warriors	47,640	5,429	2,462	No data	55,531
1812					
Guerrillas groups	17	5	13	25	60
Guerrilla warriors	46,229	4,550	1,486	No data	52,265


Casualties

SPAIN

While the casualties among the guerrilla groups are almost impossible to estimate, they were certainly high. With regard to the regular Spanish Army, there is no breakdown of


casualties among the different armies. Nevertheless, between 2001 and 2008, a study of Spanish casualties in the Independence War was conducted by the Spanish scholar Esteban Canales, who took advantage of the increased interest shown because of the commemoration of the bi-centenary of the war.⁹⁸ The author cites different authors that estimate 500,000 casualties among the Spanish armies and the guerrillas; he emphasizes, however, that none of those authors provide a logical explanation of how they determined the figures.

Canales employs the mortality rates of Spain, and then compares the history during the 1808-1814 period to their previous history. He then reasons that the increased mortality should be attributed to the war. On this basis, and statistical probabilities, he concludes that the Spanish casualties must have been between 228,690 and 522,940; he estimates the actual figure is closer to the half million than to the lower end of the range. If Canales number is correct, the half million deaths represented more than 4% of the Spanish population at the time (11.5 million): in terms of deaths, it was the bloodiest war in the Spanish history.



Mortality evolution in the Spanish regions between 1800 and 1815

Source: Esteban Canales "Demografía y Guerra de España"



Evolution of Spanish population between 1787 and 1815
Source: Esteban Canales “Demografía y Guerra de España”

BRITISH

On his website ([www. Peninsulawar200](http://www.Peninsulawar200)), Charles Esdaile estimates the number of British casualties in the Peninsula War: “It was in Spain and Portugal that the largest number of British deaths occurred: some 10,000 fell in the battles of 1810-13, while total losses for the war have been estimated at a minimum of 40,000”⁹⁹

FRENCH

The majority of the scholars estimate the amount of French casualties to be around 275,000. British military historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart wrote in his book “*Strategy*”:

*Wellington's battles were materially the least effective part of the operations. By them he [Wellington] inflicted a total loss of some 45,000 men only - counting killed, wounded and prisoners - on the French during the 5 years' campaign... whereas Marbot reckoned that the number of French deaths alone during this period averaged 100 a day. Hence it is a clear deduction that the overwhelming majority of the losses which drained the French strength, and their morale still more, was due to the operations of the guerillas...*¹⁰⁰

Along the same lines, David Gates, in his book *The Spanish Ulcer*, wrote:

*...the Spanish 'nation in arms' ... may have lacked the polished professionalism of the British Light Division but, in the long run, they probably inflicted considerably more damage on the French forces than all of Wellington's pitched battles combined. The sieges of Gerona alone cost the Imperial armies over 20,000 casualties and, exclusively from sickness and guerilla raids, the French forces in the Peninsula lost approx. 100 men per day for over 4 years, a total of some 164,000 casualties. It is, therefore, easy to see how the war in Spain bled the French army white...*¹⁰¹

And, finally, Fernando Martínez Laínez, in his book “*Como Lobos Hambrientos*.”

quotes different French officers regarding the French casualties:

General Auguste Julien Bigarré, aide de camp to Joseph Bonaparte:

*The guerrillas have inflicted more casualties to the French armies than the regular armies during the whole war on Spain; it is corroborated that they assassinated more than one hundred men daily. So, in a period of time of five years, more than 180,000 French have been killed.*¹⁰²

The Baron Marcellin Marbot:

*During the six years of war since this began in 1808 till the end of 1813, the French have lost in the Peninsula 200,000 men, killed in action or in the hospitals; to them we have to add another 60,000 lost in battle against armies of other nations.*¹⁰³

And the veteran French officer Le Miére de Corvey:

Between one hundred fifty and two hundred guerrilla groups scattered along Spain had sworn to kill 130 to 140 French monthly... As the year has 12 months, we lost around 80,000 without have had any kind of battle in the open field. As the Spanish war was prolonged over seven years, there are more than 500,000 men killed.”¹⁰⁴

⁹⁷ Ronald Fraser, *La Maldita Guerra de España, Historia Social de la Guerra de Independencia 1808-1814* (Barcelona: Ed. Crítica, 2006) 795-796

⁹⁸ University of Catalonia *Páginas de Historia de Esteban Canales* <http://pagines.uab.cat/historia/> (last accessed 20 March, 2011) In the website there are two articles that address the topic of the casualties: “El impacto demográfico en la Guerra de Independencia”, Sep 2001: <http://pagines.uab.cat/historia/content/el-impacto-demogr%C3%A1fico-de-la-guerra-de-la-independencia>. And “Demografía y Guerra de España” January 2004: http://pagines.uab.cat/historia/content/1808-demograf%C3%AD-y-guerra-en-espa%C3%B1a#_ftn30

⁹⁹ Charles Esdaile, “The Peninsula War 200 anniversary”, November 2008 <http://peninsularwar200.org/> (last accessed 20 March 2011)

¹⁰⁰ Basil Liddell Hart *Strategy* (New York: Meridien, 1991) 110-111

¹⁰¹ David Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer*. 36. Gates cites the book of J. Aitchison *An Ensign in the Peninsula War* (ed. W.F.K. Thompson, 1981) p 24-5

¹⁰² Martínez Laínez, *Cómo Lobos Hambrientos*, 107

¹⁰³ Martínez Laínez, *Cómo Lobos Hambrientos*, 107

¹⁰⁴ Martínez Laínez, *Cómo Lobos Hambrientos*, 107

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY*

Color shows which armies participated in the different battles.



GREEN: victory



RED: defeat




WHITE: not participate.

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
1807				
18 Oct	French troops cross Franco-Spanish Border (28,000 men under Junot).			
27 Oct	Treaty of Fontainebleau – Napoleon agrees with Spain to invade Portugal.			
19 Nov	French troops begin crossing into Portugal.			
27- 29 Nov	Prince Regent Joao VI sails from Lisbon (to Brazil).			
30 Nov	Lisbon occupied by the French without a struggle.			
Dec	Gen Junot disbands the Portuguese Army.			
1808				
Early months	Additional 75,000 French troops cross Pyrenees.			
16 Feb	Seizure of Pamplona.			








* Chronology extracted from website "Peninsula War 200 Anniversary"
<http://peninsularwar200.org/chronology.html>

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
29 Feb	Seizure of Barcelona.			
18 Mar	Seizure of Figueras.			
19 Mar	Abdication of Spanish King, Charles IV.			
23 Mar	Madrid occupied by the French without struggle.			
10 Apr	Ferdinand departs to Bayonne to meet up with Napoleon.			
2 May	Madrid "Dos de Mayo" uprising.			
25 May	Province of Asturias declares war on France.			
May-Jun	Insurrections against the French throughout Spain and Portugal			
6 Jun	Insurrection starts in Portugal.			
6 Jun	Supreme Junta in Seville declares war on France - Spanish War of Independence officially commences.			
6 Jun	Combat at Bruch Pass			
7 Jun	Combat at Alcolea			
8-14 Jun	Combat at Tudela, Mallen & Alagon			
12 Jun	Combat at Cabezon			
14 Jun	Second Combat at Bruch Pass			
14 Jun	Spanish garrison and fleet at Cadiz capture French squadron.			



DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
15 Jun	First Siege of Zaragoza starts			
18 Jun	Fortress of Faro falls to the Portuguese.			
19 Jun	Portuguese Supreme Junta organised by the Bishop of Oporto.			
20 Jun	French assault on Gerona - fails			
24 Jun	Combat at Epila			
26 Jun	French capture and sack the Portuguese towns of Vila Visoza & Beja.			
26-28 Jun	French assault on Valencia - fails			
27 Jun	Portuguese take the fort of Santa Caterina at Figueira da Foz.			
30 Jun	Combat on the Llobregat			
5 Jul	Spain and Britain officially declare peace having been at war sine 1804.			
6 Jul	French take and sack Leiria, but later fall back on Lisbon.			
9 Jul	Joseph Bonaparte, future "King of Spain", crosses Pyrenees.			
11Jul	Investment of Rosas.			
12 Jul	Wellesley and his troops set sail from Cork.			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
14 Jul	Battle of Medina de Rio Seco			
16 Jul	Combat at Mengibar			
16 Jul	Portuguese levies surround and blockade the fortress at Almeida.			
20 Jul	King Joseph enters Madrid.			
20 Jul	Dupont capitulates at Bailén— greatest Spanish victory of the War.			
24 Jul	Preparations begin for Siege of Gerona			
29 Jul	Loison engages Portuguese at Evora			
Early Aug	Napoleon orders 130,000 men to be withdrawn from Germany to deploy to Peninsula - Ney, Lannes, Soult, St. Cyr and Victor under orders to join them.			
Aug – Oct	French and Spanish defensive preparations along the line of Rio Ebro.			
1 Aug	King Joseph evacuates Madrid – retires North of Rio Ebro.			
1-8 Aug	Wellesley’s British Army lands at Mondego Bay, Portugal.			
12 Aug	Wellesley meets Portuguese leaders – Portuguese contingent joins British Army.			
14 Aug	First Siege of Zaragoza ends– Spanish hold out.			
16 Aug	Siege of Gerona defeated.			









DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
17 Aug	Combat at Roliça			
21 Aug	Battle of Vimeiro			
21 Aug	Sir Harry Burrard arrives and assumes command of British Army in Portugal.			
22 Aug	Sir Hew Dalrymple arrives and takes over command from Burrard.			
24 Aug	Sir John Moore arrives in Portugal.			
25 Aug	Jourdan arrives in Miranda and assumes command of French armies.			
31 Aug	Convention of Sintra ratified – French agree to leave Portugal.			
15 Sep	Last French troops leave Portugal.			
Mid Sep	Burrard, Dalrymple and Wellesley recalled to London.			
25 Sep	Orders despatched to Portugal for Moore to assume command to cooperate with the Spanish in the expulsion of the French from Spain. (Received on 6 Oct).			
18 Oct	Bulk of Moore's army en-route to Salamanca.			
25-26 Oct	Combat at Logroño and Lerin			
27 Oct	Moore leaves Lisbon.			
31 Oct	Battle of Zornoza			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
3 Nov	Napoleon arrives "in theatre" at Bayonne.			
5 Nov	Combat at Valmaceda			
8 Nov	Combat at Guenes			
10 Nov	Battle of Espinosa			
10 Nov	Battle of Burgos ó de Gamonal			
23 Nov	Battle of Tudela— Castaños routed and relieved of command.			
23 Nov	Moore's advance guard arrives at Salamanca.			
30 Nov	Combat at the Pass of Somosierra			
2 Dec	Napoleon arrives at the gates of Madrid.			
3 Dec	Madrid capitulates.			
5 Dec	Siege of Rosas ends Spanish supported by Royal Navy and Marines.			
10 Dec	Moore's British Army advances from Salamanca.			
16 Dec	Battle of Cardadeu			
20 Dec	Second Siege of Zaragoza commences.			
21 Dec	Combat at Sahagun			
21 Dec	Battle of Molins de Rey			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
24 Dec	Moore retreats from Sahagun to Corunna.			
29 Dec	Combat at Benavente fighting withdrawal, largely attributed as a British			
30 Dec	Combat at Mansilla			
31 Dec	Moore refuses to fight and evacuates Astorga.			

1809

1 Jan	Napoleon decides to return to France – resting at Valladolid from 6-17 Jan.			
3 Jan	Combat at Cacabellos fighting withdrawal, largely attributed as a British victory.			
5 Jan	Rearguard action at Constantino			
6 Jan	Moore offers battle at Lugo, Soult declines.			
8 Jan	Night of, Moore continues retreat.			
11 Jan	Moore and bulk of army reach La Coruña.			
13 Jan	Battle of Ucles (
16 Jan	Battle of La Coruña largely considered a British success as the majority of the British Army was evacuated.			
17 Jan	Napoleon leaves Spain.			















DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
22 Jan	King Joseph re-established in Madrid.			
End Jan	Soult plans second French invasion of Portugal.			
Early Feb	Maj-Gen Beresford appointed commander of Portuguese Army.			
18 Feb	Combat at Igualada			
20 Feb	Second Siege of Zaragoza ends			
25 Feb	Battle of Valls			
9 Mar	Soult's vanguard enters Portugal.			
22 Apr	Wellesley arrives back in Lisbon – commanding both British & Portuguese.			
18 Apr	Rearguard at D'Amarante commences			
3 May	Rearguard at D'Amarante completed			
11 May	Combat at Grijon			
12 May	Wellesley takes Oporto			
18 May	Pursuit of Soult abandoned – Portugal liberated for second time.			
22 May	Wellesley approaches Gen Cuesta regarding combined operations against the French in Spain			
22 May	Combat near Santiago			
23 May	Battle of Alcañiz			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
24 May	Second Siege of Gerona commences.			
8 Jun	Combat at River Oitaben			
15 Jun	Battle of Maria. Spanish conducted themselves well at the battle but were routed the next day at Belchite			
Mid Jun	Victor withdraws from Estremadura - arrives at Talavera on 26 Jun.			
End Jun	Soult abandons Galicia.			
3 July	The British Army enters Spain.			
28 Jul	Battle of Talavera			
8 Aug	Combat at Arzobispo			
11 Aug	Battle of Almonacid			
26 Aug	Wellesley elevated to peerage – Viscount Wellington of Talavera.			
1 Sep	Combat at Salt			
18 Oct	Battle of Tamames			
20 Oct	Work commences of the Lines of Torres Vedras.			
19 Nov	Battle of Ocaña			











DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
20 Nov	Wellington issues orders for the withdrawal to Portugal.			
28 Nov	Battle of Alba de Tormes			
11 Dec	Second Siege of Gerona completed Victory at considerable cost.			
25 Dec	Wellington's Peninsular army in Portugal.			
1810				
Early Jan	Joseph and Soult (now his COS) turn their attention to Andalusia.			
16 Jan	Siege of Hostalrich commences.			
29 Jan	Central Junta resigns in light of Spanish failures.			
5 Feb	Siege of Cadiz commences (lifted on 24 Aug 1812).			
20 Feb	Battle of Vich			
21 Mar	Siege of Astorga commences.			
11 Apr	Siege of Lerida commences.			
15 Apr	Combat at Zalamena			
17 Apr	Imperial Decree announces Masséna's Army of Portugal.			
22 Apr	Siege of Astorga completed			
23 Apr	Combat at Margalef			













DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
26Apr.	First Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo commences.			
12 May	Siege of Hostalrich concluded			
13 May	Siege of Lerida concluded			
15 May	Siege of Mequinenza commences.			
26 May	Combat at Aracena			
5 Jun	Siege of Mequinenza completed			
10 Jul	Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo completed			
10 Jul	Combat at Barquilla			
24 Jul	Combat on the Coa (at Almeida)			
11 Aug	Combat at Villagarcia			
15 Aug	Siege of Almeida commences.			
27 Aug	Siege of Almeida completed			
14 Sep	Combat at La Bispal			
27 Sep	Battle of Bussaco			
29 Sep	Wellington's Army retreats to Lines of Torres Vedras.			
13 Oct	Attempted siege of Fuengirola fails			
3 Nov	Rout of Gen Blake at Baza			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
16 Dec	Siege of Tortosa commences.			
1811				
2 Jan	Siege of Tortosa concluded			
11 Jan	Siege of Olivenza commences.			
15 Jan	Combat at Pla (
23 Jan	Siege of Olivenza concluded			
25 Jan	Combat at Villanueva (de los Castillejos)			
26 Jan	Siege of Badajoz commences.			
19 Feb	Battle of Gevora			
3 Mar	Massena retreats from Santarem.			
5 Mar	Battle of Barrosa – Chiclana			
11-15 Mar	Series of rearguard actions fought by the French as the "Army of Portugal" retreat			
11 Mar	Combat at Pombal			
12 Mar	Combat at Redinha			
13 Mar	Combat at Condeixa			
14 Mar	Combat at Casal Novo			
15 Mar	Combat at Foz d'Arouce			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
11 Mar	Siege of Badajoz concluded			
15 Ma	Siege of Campo Mayor commences.			
15-16 Mar	Siege of Albuquerque			
19 Mar	Spanish surprised during their attack on Monjuch			
21 Mar	Siege of Campo Mayor concluded			
25 – 26 Mar	Combat at Campo Mayor– inconclusive.			
3 Apr	Combat at Sabugal			
7 Apr	Siege of Almeida commences.			
9 Apr .	Spanish capture Fort and town of Figueras.			
9 Apr	British Siege of Olivenza commences.			
10 Apr	Siege of Figueras commences.			
11 Apr	Masséna reaches Salamanca.			
12 Apr	Blockade of Almeida commences.			
15 Apr	British Siege of Olivenza concluded			
23 Apr	King Joseph covertly departs Madrid, arrives Paris 15 May.			
3-5 May	Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro–, Masséna retreats on morning of 6 May			
3 May	Combat at Figueras			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
4 May	Siege of Tarragona commences.			
6 May	First British Siege of Badajoz commences.			
10 May.	Blockade of Almeida concludes when the French escape.			
11 May	Siege of Almeida concluded			
11 May	Marmont assumes command of the Army of Portugal			
12 May	First British Siege of Badajoz ends – raised due to French advances.			
16 May	Battle of Albuera victory with heavy allied losses.			
19 May	Second British siege of Badajoz commences.			
25 May	Combat of Usagre			
10 Jun	Second British siege of Badajoz ends – Wellington abandons siege.			
16 Jun	Marmont and Soult join forces and relieve Badajoz on 20 Jun.			
16 Jun	King Joseph departs Paris, arrives Madrid 16 Jul.			
23-25 Jun	Wellington offers battle on the Caia- Soult and Marmont declines.			
23 Jun	Combat at Benavides			
28 Jun	Siege of Tarragona completed			
2 Jul	Combat on the River Orbigo			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
25 Jul	Storming of Montserrat Mountain			
10 Aug	Wellington begins blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo.			
19 Aug	Siege of Figueras concluded			
23 Sep	French arrive at Ciudad Rodrigo, British pull back.			
23 Sep	Siege of Saguntum (Sagonte) commences.			
25 Sep	Combat at El Bodon probing action by the French.			
25 Sep	Combat at Carpio			
27 Sep	Combat at Aldea da Ponte			
28 Sep	Wellington offers battle in front of Sabugal – Marmont refuses to advance.			
25 Oct	Battle of Saguntum			
26 Oct	Siege of Saguntum concluded			
28 Oct	Action at Arroyo dos Molinos- Hill surprises Girard.			
29 Oct – 2 Nov	Spanish irregular raids into southern France (Valley of Cerdagne).			
5 Nov	Combat at Bornos			
20 Dec	Siege of Tarifa commences.			
28 Dec	Siege of Valencia commences.			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
29 Dec	Combat at Membrillo			
1812				
4 Jan	Victor calls off the Siege of Tarifa			
8 Jan	Wellington commences Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.			
9 Jan	Siege of Valencia concluded			
18 Jan	Combat at Villaseca			
19 Jan	Wellington takes Ciudad Rodrigo			
20 Jan	Siege of Peñíscola commences.			
24 Jan	Combat at Altafulla			
2 Feb	Siege of Peñíscola concluded			
5 Mar	Combat at Roda			
16 Mar	Third British siege of Badajoz commences.			
6 Apr	Wellington takes Badajoz			
11 Apr	Combat at Villagarcia			
18 May	Hill's assaults on the Forts at the Bridge of Almaraz			
1 Jun	Combat at Bornos			
11 Jun	Combat at Maguilla			
15 Jun	Siege of Astorga commences.			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
18 Jun	Siege of the 3 Salamanca Forts commences.			
21 Jun	Storm of Lequeitio by R Adm Home Popham.			
27 Jun	Salamanca Forts surrender			
7-8 Jul	Siege and capture of Castro Urdiales			
18 Jul	Combat at Castrejon			
18 Jul	Combat at Castrillo			
21 Jul	Battle of Castalla			
22 Jul	Battle of Salamanca			
22 Jul – 2 Aug.	R Adm Popham blockades and occupies Santander.			
23 Jul	Combat at Garcia Hernandez			
31 Jul	Gen Maitland lands at Palamos with an expeditionary force from Sicily.			
2 Aug	Port of Santander taken by the Allies			
11 Aug	Combat at Majalahonda			
11 Aug	King Joseph departs Madrid.			
12 Aug	Soult commences the evacuation of Andalusia.			
12-13 Aug	Madrid falls to the Allies – Wellington enters.			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
13 Aug	Spanish take Bilbao.			
14 Aug	Gen Santocildes abandons Valladolid; French retake the city.			
18 Aug	Siege of Astorga concluded			
24 Aug	Soult calls-off Siege of Cadiz (since 5 Feb 1810)			
18 Sep	Wellington commences the Siege of Burgos.			
20 Oct	Wellington raises the siege of Burgos and retreats			
23 Oct	Gen Ballasteros attempts a coup d'état.			
23 Oct	Combat at Venta Del Pozo			
23 Oct	Combat at Villadrigo			
25 Oct	Combat at Villa Muriel			
30 Oct	Combat at Puente Larga inconclusive.			
10 – 11Nov	Combat at Alba de Tormes			
15 Nov	Wellington offers Battle at Salamanca.			
17 Nov	Combat at San Muñoz (or Huebra)inconclusive.			
19 Nov	The Allied Army retreat from Ciudad Rodrigo.			
23 Dec	Wellington arrives in Cadiz to discuss his plans for reorganisation.			

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DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
1813				
10 Feb	Combat at Poza			
20 Feb	Raid on Bejar			
23 Mar	Joseph transfers his headquarters to Valladolid from Madrid.			
31 Mar	Combat at Lerin			
11 Apr	Combat at Yecla			
11 –12 Apr	Siege of Villena			
12 Apr	Combat at Biar Rearguard Action.			
13 Apr	Battle of Castalla			
29 Apr	Siege of Castro-Urdiales commences.			
12 May	Siege of Castro-Urdiales concluded			
22 May	Wellington's final offensive in Spain commences.			
27 May	French evacuate Madrid.			
2 Jun	Combat at Morales			
3 Jun	French evacuate Valladolid.			
3 Jun	Siege of Tarragona by Gen Murray commences.			
12 Jun	Joseph abandons Burgos and retreats.			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
13 Jun	Combat at Carcagente			
15 Jun	Siege of Tarragona lifted by Gen Murray			
18 Jun	Combat at Osma			
18 Jun	Combat at San Millan			
21 Jun	Battle of Vitoria			
24 Jun	Combat at Villafranca inconclusive.			
25 Jun	Blockade around Pamplona commences.			
26 Jun	Combat at Tolosa			
7 Jul	Combat at Maya inconclusive.			
8 Jul	Combat at La Salud			
10 Jul	Spanish irregulars under Mina capture Zaragoza.			
11 Jul	First Siege of San Sebastian commences.			
25 Jul	First Siege of San Sebastian ends in failure			
25 Jul – 1 Aug	Battle of the Pyrenees.			
25 Jul	Combat at Roncesvalles inconclusive.			
25 Jul	French force the Maya Pass			
26 Jul	Combat at Linzoain			


DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
28 Jul	First Battle of Sorauren			
30 Jul	Second Battle of Sorauren			
30 Jul	Combat at Beunza			
31 Jul	Combat at Venta de Urroz			
1 Aug	Combat at Sumbilla			
1 Aug	Combat at Yanzi			
2 Aug	Combat at Echalar			
30 Jul	Blockade of Tarragona by Gen Bentinck commences.			
1 Aug	Soult and the French Army retreat into France.			
6 Aug	Second Siege of San Sebastian commences.			
15 Aug	Blockade of Tarragona lifted by Gen Bentinck			
19 Aug	Combat at Amposta			
31 Aug	San Sebastian falls to the Allies			
31 Aug	Battle of San Marcial			
1 – 8 Sep	Citadel of San Sebastian captured			
13 Sep	Combat at Ordal			
14 Sep	Combat at Villafranca inconclusive.			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
7 – 8 Oct	Wellington crosses the Bidassoa & Battle of Vera			
31 Oct	Pamplona falls to the Allies			
10 Nov	Battle of the Nivelle			
21 Nov	Wellington sends his Spanish allies back to Spain.			
9-13 Dec	Battles on the Nive			
9 Dec	Combat at Villefranque			
9 Dec	9 Dec - Combat at Anglet inconclusive.			
10 Dec	Combat at Arcangues inconclusive.			
10 Dec	First Combat at Barrouillet inconclusive.			
11 Dec	Second Combat at Barrouillet inconclusive.			
13 De	Battle of St. Pierre			
1814				
16 Jan	Combat at Molins de Rey inconclusive.			
2 Feb	The Cortes rejects Napoleon’s Treaty of Valençay.			
12 Feb	Wellington’s new offensive commences.			
15 Feb	Combat at Garris			
16 Feb	Combat at Arriverayte			

DATE	EVENT	FRENCH	SPAIN	BRITAIN
23 Feb	Blockade of Bayonne commences.			
27 Feb	St. Étienne stormed and captured			
27 Feb	Battle of Orthez			
2 Mar	Combat at Aire			
12 Mar	Insurrection at Bordeaux – French welcomes the allies and return of their King.			
19 Mar	Combat at Vic-Bigorre inconclusive.			
20 Mar	Combat at Tarbes inconclusive.			
24 Mar	Ferdinand VII re-enters Spain.			
6 Apr	Combat at Étauliers			
8 Apr	Combat at Croix D'Orade			
10 Apr	Battle of Toulouse			
14 Apr	French Sortie at St. Étienne			
16 Apr	Sortie from Barcelona			
11-16 Apr	French forces capitulate and end of the Peninsular War.			
26 Apr	Bayonne capitulates.			

APPENDIX D

Chronology of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon*



* David M. Hildebrand "Baltimore Teacher" last access: 1 March, 2011, <http://baltimoreteacher.com>